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JURISPRUDENCE THAT NECESSARILY EMBODIES MORAL 
JUDGMENT: THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT, CATHOLIC TEACHING, 
AND DEATH PENALTY DISCOURSE  
 
KURT M. DENK
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Despite obvious differences, certain historical and 
conceptual underpinnings of Catholic death penalty 
teaching parallel core elements of U.S. death penalty 
jurisprudence, particularly given the Supreme Court’s 
expansive yet contested moral reasoning in Kennedy v. 
Louisiana, which stressed that Eighth Amendment 
analysis “‘necessarily embodies a moral judgment.’” 1  
This Article compares that jurisprudence with the 
Catholic Church’s present, near-absolute opposition to 
capital punishment, assessing how the death penalty, as a 
quintessential law and morality question, implicates 
overlapping sources of moral reasoning.  It then 
identifies substantive concepts that permit Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence and the Catholic perspective 
to be mutually translated, presenting this approach as a 
means to advance death penalty discourse. 
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1
 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419 (2008) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 
U.S. 238, 382 (1972) (Burger, C. J., dissenting)). 
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INTRODUCTION 
The legal implications of religion’s often contested presence in the public 
square remain at the forefront of national consciousness, as evidenced by debate 
over the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 
Church v. EEOC.
2
  This is no less true with the death penalty.  As Professor David 
Garland has argued, “religiosity and moralism” are among “recurring themes that 
feature prominently in the American public sphere [and] … ha[ve] a bearing on the 
punishment of offenders and on death penalty politics.” 3   Accordingly, “[t]o 
understand today’s American death penalty … we must try to see its moral power, 
its emotional appeal, its claim to be doing justice.”4 
In comparing U.S. jurisprudence with Catholic death penalty teaching, this 
Article aims to contribute to such understanding.
5
  Four years after Baze v. Rees 
ended a brief, de facto national moratorium on executions,
6
 the moral, including 
religious, dimensions of capital punishment remain both poignant and contested.
7
  
                                                     
2
 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC., ___ S. Ct. ____, 
2012 WL 75047 (Jan. 11, 2012) (holding that the First Amendment’s Establishment and 
Free Exercise Clauses bar employment discrimination suits by ministers against churches).  
Professor Michael Stokes Paulsen praised the ruling as “absolutely, completely right” and 
“a dramatic defense of religious liberty.”  Hosanna in the Highest!, PUBLIC DISCOURSE: 
ETHICS, LAW, AND THE COMMON GOOD, http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2012/01/4541 
(Jan. 13, 2012).  On the other side of the public square, The New York Times editorialized 
that “[t]he [C]ourt’s conception of the ministerial role is more encompassing than it has 
been defined by state and federal appellate courts,” and that its “sweeping deference to 
churches does not serve them or society wisely.”  The Ministerial Exception, Editorial, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2012, at A22.  
3
 DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION: AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY IN AN AGE 
OF ABOLITION 175 (2010). 
4
 Id. at 7. 
5
 Concerning this Article’s definitions of jurisprudence and of Catholic teaching, see, 
respectively, notes 63 and 218-21, infra, and accompanying text. 
6
 Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 40-41 (2008) (plurality opinion), upheld Kentucky’s 
three-drug lethal injection protocol, similar to what all jurisdictions employing it then used.  
Litigation akin to that in Baze led to a de facto national moratorium on executions from 
September 2007 until shortly after Baze was decided in April 2008.  Death Penalty in Flux, 
DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER (hereinafter, DPIC), 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-penalty-flux (last visited Sept. 20, 2011). 
7
 This Article largely adopts the definition of “moral” as “relating to principles of right 
and wrong in behavior,” “expressing or teaching a conception of right behavior,” and/or 
pertaining to that which is “sanctioned by or operative on one’s conscience or ethical 
4 JURISPRUDENCE THAT NECESSARILY EMBODIES MORAL JUDGMENT:  
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In declaring last November that he would permit no executions to proceed while 
still in office, Oregon Governor John Kitzhaber explained that he “cannot 
participate … in something [he] believe[s] to be morally wrong.”8  In March 2011, 
longtime death penalty supporter Governor Pat Quinn expressly acknowledged his 
Catholic faith in forming his decision to sign a bill abolishing the Illinois death 
penalty.
9
  Whether coincidental or not, the state that abandoned the death penalty 
prior to Illinois was New Mexico, in 2009, where analysts cited strong religious 
opposition behind abolition, and where the governor who signed the legislation, 
Bill Richardson, is also Catholic.
10
  New Mexico’s predecessor in repeal was New 
Jersey, in 2007, where death penalty opposition by the Catholic Church—the 
state’s largest denomination—also was among pro-abolition forces.11 
Religion does impact public thinking about capital punishment.  According 
to the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 62% of Americans support capital 
punishment for murder, and while 22% “with an opinion about the death penalty 
… cite their education as [the] most important” factor, 19% “say that religion is the 
most important influence on their thinking.” 12   Religiousness per se does not 
necessarily predict a given view: majorities of white evangelicals, mainline 
Protestants, and Catholics favor the death penalty; majorities of black Protestants 
and Hispanic Catholics do not.  But 32% of death penalty opponents—and 31% of 
                                                                                                                                      
judgment” or is “perceptual or psychological … in nature or effect.”  MERRIAM-WEBSTER, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/moral (last visited Dec. 2, 2011). 
8
 Press Release, Governor John Kitzhaber, Governor Kitzhaber issues reprieve—calls 
for action on capital punishment (Nov. 22, 2011), 
http://governor.oregon.gov/Gov/media_room/press_releases/p2011/press_112211.shtml. 
9
 Samuel G. Freedman, Faith Was on the Governor’s Shoulder, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 
2011, at A15.  Eight years before, Governor George Ryan commuted all Illinois death 
sentences, also sharing “that his personal religious beliefs deeply influenced his thinking 
about the [death penalty’s] injustice.”  Erik C. Owens and Eric P. Elshtain, Religion and 
Capital Punishment: An Introduction 2, in RELIGION AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A CALL 
FOR RECKONING (Erik C. Owens, John D. Carlson & Eric P. Elshtain eds. 2004). 
10
 Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Cost and Capital Punishment: A New 
Consideration Transforms an Old Debate, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 117, 121-22 (2010). 
11
 Martin J. Martin, Killing Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The First State in 
Modern History to Repeal its Death Penalty Statute, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 485, 498-99 & 
nn.100, 109 (2010). 
12
 THE PEW FORUM ON RELIGION AND PUBLIC LIFE, PUBLIC OPINION ON THE DEATH 
PENALTY (Sept. 23, 2011), http://pewforum.org/Death-Penalty/Public-Opinion-on-the-
Death-Penalty.aspx.  “[F]ewer cite the media or personal experience (15% each)” and 
“[j]ust 7% say the views of friends or family are the most important influence.”  Id. 
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Catholic death penalty opponents—cite religion as the top influence on their views, 
versus 13% among death penalty proponents.
13
 
Thus a broad range of voices fill the death penalty’s moral contours.  Troy 
Davis’s September 2011 execution illustrates this: his innocence claims, which 
various courts and Georgia’s Board of Pardons and Paroles rejected, spurred 
630,000 letters pleading for a stay of execution, and clemency appeals from Pope 
Benedict XVI, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, former President Jimmy Carter, dozens 
of members of Congress, and even prominent death penalty supporters.
14
  In his 
final words, Mr. Davis maintained his innocence, urged a “deeper [look] into []his 
case … [to] see the truth,” and closed in benediction: “For those about to take my 
life, may God have mercy on all of your souls.  God bless you all.”15 
This Article offers three contributions to this discourse.  Part I asserts that 
because the U.S. death penalty has significant religious roots and resonance, and 
given how enmeshed Kennedy v. Louisiana is in its moral contours, it remains a 
quintessential law and morality question.
16
  But that premise simply begs further 
inquiry: to what extent might religious sources of moral reasoning be relevant?  
Parts II and III compare U.S. death penalty jurisprudence and Catholic death 
penalty teaching, via critical exegesis of Kennedy as a text of judicial moral 
reasoning.
17
  This comparison focuses on both the expansiveness and limitations of 
                                                     
13
 Id. 
14
 Peter Wilkinson, World Shocked by U.S. execution of Troy Davis, CNN.COM (Sept. 
22, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/09/22/world/davis-world-reaction/; A Grievous 
Wrong: The Davis case in Georgia is further proof of the barbarity of the death penalty, 
Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2011, at A30. 
15
 Statement by Troy Davis, Sept. 21, 2011, as reprinted in John Rudolf, Troy Davis’ 
Last Words Released by Georgia Department of Corrections, HUFFINGTONPOST, Oct. 7, 
2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/07/troy-davis-execution-last-
words_n_1000648.html.  
16
 Kennedy barred the death penalty for child rape not resulting in the victim’s death.  
554 U.S. at 413. 
17
 This Article parallels or develops analyses that both pre- and post-date Kennedy.  
Prior to Kennedy, Professor Saby Ghoshray compared Catholic teaching with the Court’s 
categorical bans on capital punishment for persons with mental retardation and juvenile 
offenders, Tracing the Moral Contours of the Evolving Standards of Decency: The 
Supreme Court’s Capital Jurisprudence Post-Roper, 45 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 561, 600-06 
(2006) (discussing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), and Roper v. Simmons, 543 
U.S. 551 (2005)), while Professor Michael S. Moore studied moral reasoning dimensions in 
Supreme Court jurisprudence.  Morality in Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, 31 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 47 (2008).  Following Kennedy, an incisive Comment interpreted the 
6 JURISPRUDENCE THAT NECESSARILY EMBODIES MORAL JUDGMENT:  
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Kennedy, buttressing the claim that Catholic teaching’s relatively recent trajectory 
towards near-absolute opposition to capital punishment makes it both relevant and 
potentially useful to the U.S. context, especially because its reasoning is not 
coterminous with theology.  Part IV argues that “translatable” categories of moral 
reasoning thus permit secular and religious perspectives to be in dialogue, thereby 
advancing death penalty discourse. 
 
I. LAW, MORALITY, AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT’S 
RELIGIOUS DIMENSIONS 
For decades the Supreme Court has affirmed that the Eighth Amendment’s 
ban on cruel and unusual punishment, which governs a large swath of death 
penalty jurisprudence, “‘draws its meaning from the evolving standards of decency 
that mark the progress of a maturing society.’”18  In 2008, Kennedy v. Louisiana  
stressed that this jurisprudence “‘necessarily embodies a moral judgment.’”19 
Kennedy’s use of this phrase is instructive, and inspired this Article’s title.  
For it appears to adopt, as a principle of constitutional law, Chief Justice Warren E. 
Burger’s passing observation about moral judgment three dozen years prior in his 
dissent in Furman v. Georgia, where he remarked that “[a] punishment is 
inordinately cruel, in the sense [relevant to Eighth Amendment analysis,] … 
chiefly as perceived by the society so characterizing it.  The standard of extreme 
                                                                                                                                      
case in light of moral foundation theory, proposing that limitations of the majority’s moral 
reasoning are instructive vis-à-vis that theory’s potential contributions to legal practice.  
Colin Prince, Moral Foundation Theory and the Law, Comment, 33 Seattle U. L. Rev. 
1293 (2010).  More recently, Professor Mary Sigler has critiqued the moral skepticism of 
the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, offering as an alternative a defense of the 
evolving standards of decency framework as consistent with the “political morality” proper 
to liberal democracy, The Political Morality of the Eighth Amendment, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. 
L. 403 (2011), while Professor Shandrea P. Solomon has praised Kennedy’s proportionality 
analysis as consistent with moral foundations of law, justice, and retributivism.  National 
Consensus, Retributive Theory, and Foundations of Justice and Morality in Eighth 
Amendment Jurisprudence: A Response to Advocates of the Child Rape Death Penalty 
Statute in Kennedy v. Louisiana, 13 SCHOLAR 583 (2011).  Professor John F. Stinneford, 
on the other hand, has severely criticized Kennedy’s Eighth Amendment analysis and what 
he characterizes as the Court’s over-reaching therein.  Rethinking Proportionality Under 
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 899 (2011). 
18
 Id. at 419 (brackets omitted) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 87-88, 101 
(1958) (plurality opinion)); 419-20 (summarizing Eighth Amendment jurisprudence). 
19
 Id. at 419 (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 382 (Burger, C. J., dissenting)).  
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cruelty is not merely descriptive, but necessarily embodies a moral judgment.”20  
By comparison, a majority of the Court in Kennedy set forth that the Eighth 
Amendment “draws its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark 
the progress of a maturing society.  This is because the standard of extreme cruelty 
is not merely descriptive, but necessarily embodies a moral judgment.” 21   No 
Supreme Court case prior to Kennedy quoted this phrase, much less presented it as 
central to Eighth Amendment analysis as this Article argues it does.
22
 
Shortly before Kennedy was decided, Professor Michael Moore argued that 
“Eighth Amendment jurisprudence reveals that judges continually engage in moral 
reasoning.”23  Kennedy fits his thesis that this jurisprudence consists of “miniature 
essays in judicial philosophy, so [that] Eighth Amendment interpretation is … 
theorized as a moral enterprise by [its] judges.” 24  And of what do its “difficult 
questions rooted in morality” consist?: theories of punishment, proportionality, and 
culpability; inquiry into whether someone “deserves” to die; and the weighing of 
aggravating or mitigating factors, including an offender’s own moral agency.25  
Such are the moral reasoning dimensions of death penalty jurisprudence.  Some 
scholars and jurists deny the validity of judges’ moralizing— including Justice 
Scalia, whose views Professor Moore addresses.
26
  But justices do decide cases 
                                                     
20
 Furman, 408 U.S. at 382 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).  Concerning Furman’s precise 
holding, see notes ___ and accompanying text. 
21
 Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 419 (internal quotation marks, citations, and brackets omitted; 
emphasis added).   
22
 Kennedy’s use of the phrase has greater meaning given its later reiteration outside 
the death penalty context, as when the Court held that the Eighth Amendment bars life 
without parole sentences for nonhomicide juvenile offenders, requiring juvenile sentences 
to provide “some realistic opportunity to obtain release.”  Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 
2011, 2034 (2010).  Graham—like Kennedy, written by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy—
reiterated that “courts must look beyond historical conceptions to the evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society … because the standard of extreme 
cruelty is not merely descriptive, but necessarily embodies a moral judgment.”  Id. at 2021 
(internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted).  On November 7, 2011, the 
Court granted two certiorari petitions seeking to extend Graham to juveniles convicted of 
homicide.  Miller v. Alabama, docket no. 10-9646, Jackson v. Hobbs, docket no. 10-9647. 
23
 Moore, supra note 17, at 52. 
24
 Id. at 48. 
25
 See id. at 52 (citations and references omitted). 
26
 See id.  See also Stinneford, supra note 17, at 922 (characterizing the Court’s recent 
Eighth Amendment decisions, including Kennedy, as “disingenuous” and “manipulati[ve]” 
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based on their “independent judgment,” at least in part.27  This Article assesses 
how Kennedy does so quite expansively—even if, in some ways, with insufficient 
coherence.
28
  Kennedy’s mixed bag of moral reasoning thus shows how capital 
punishment remains a law and morality question par excellence. 
A. Capital punishment as law and morality question 
Commentators routinely address capital punishment as a law and morality 
question.  However, it is not always clear what this means.  Disagreement between 
the Kennedy majority and dissenters thus may simply echo a broader socio-cultural 
“search [for] a unifying principle.” 29   In any event, broad social discourse is 
relevant to death penalty jurisprudence, which takes “the basic mores of society” 
into account.
30
  But its moral dimensions still require critical analysis:  when do 
moral intuitions give way to the moral reasoning proper to jurisprudence? 
For example, New York Times editorials cite both justice and morality in 
repeated calls to abolish the death penalty.  Following Ohio’s botched attempt in 
                                                                                                                                      
in their application of justices’ own normative judgments).  The Kennedy dissent, discussed 
in Part II(B), also contests the Court’s deployment of its own normative judgments.   
27
 Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 421.  See also id. at 434 (“‘[T]he Constitution contemplates 
that in the end our own judgment will be brought to bear on the … acceptability of the 
death penalty under the Eighth Amendment.”’ (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 597 (plurality 
opinion); citing Simmons, 543 U.S. at 563; Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982))). 
(N.B.: this Article follows the practice of some authors and short-cites Roper v. 
Simmons as Simmons, corresponding to the name of the prevailing defendant-respondent.  
See, e.g., Elisabeth Semel, Reflections on Justice John Paul Stevens’s Concurring Opinion 
in Baze v. Rees: A Fifth Gregg Justice Renounces Capital Punishment, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 783 (2010).  Because some authorities relied on here short-cite it as Roper—including 
Kennedy—it should be noted that references to Roper or to Simmons are to the same case.) 
28
 Professor John Stinneford in particular has criticized the Court’s Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence as “wildly inconsistent” and having “gone off the rails,” The Original 
Meaning of “Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1739, 1740 (2008), recently characterizing its proportionality analysis per se as 
“both narrow and unprincipled.”  Rethinking Proportionality, supra note 17, at 907.  See 
also Eric Berger, In Search of a Theory of Deference: The Eighth Amendment, Democratic 
Pedigree, and Constitutional Decision Making, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 1 (2010) 
(describing “recent Eighth Amendment death penalty case law [a]s in disarray, and the 
confusion … symptomatic of a larger problem in constitutional doctrine.”). 
29
 Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 437 (characterizing the Court’s Eighth Amendment case law).  
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion. 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Thomas joined Justice Alito’s dissent. 
30
 Id. at 419 (quotation omitted). 
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2009 to execute Mr. Romell Broom by lethal injection, the Times declared that the 
event “reinforced that any form of capital punishment is legally suspect and 
morally wrong.”31  Twice in September 2011 alone it called for abolition.  Citing 
Troy Davis’s execution as evidence of arbitrariness and racial and other inequities, 
it described the death penalty as “grotesque and immoral.” 32   More recently, 
praising Delaware Governor Jack Markell’s decision to commute a death sentence, 
the Times opined that “[i]mposing the death penalty in [that] case, as in any case, 
would have been grossly unjust.” 33   But according to what moral code, or 
following upon what sort of ethical analysis, does it reach such conclusions? 
Individual commentators’ reflections on capital punishment provide some 
clue, invoking, as they do, socially reflexive moral consciousness.  Andrew Cohen 
of The Atlantic has affirmed “that capital punishment has a role in the American 
criminal justice system,” but criticizes capital jurisdictions’ willingness to overlook 
“rule of law” restraints on its use, observing that “[i]n America we aim to give the 
guilty more justice than they deserve.  We do so because of how that reflects upon 
us, not about how it reflects upon the guilty.  And when we fail to do so it says 
more about us than it does about the condemned.” 34  Subsequently summarizing a 
2011 year-end report pegging death penalty support at its lowest level, and 
opposition at its highest, in nearly forty years, Cohen opined that more people 
know in their hearts to be true[ that t]he death penalty 
experiment is failing yet again.  Undermined by 
overzealous prosecutors, a hobby-horse for incurious 
politicians, too often taken unseriously by jurors and 
witnesses, capital punishment in America has 
devolved since 1976 into a costly, inaccurate, racially 
biased, and unseemly proposition.
35
   
                                                     
31
 There Is No ‘Humane’ Execution, Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2009, at A30. 
32
 An Indefensible Punishment: The death penalty, unjust and arbitrary, cannot be 
made to conform to the Constitution, Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2011, at A28.  The 
Times also called for abolition given statistics indicating racism in the military death 
penalty.  The Military and the Death Penalty, Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2011, at A28. 
33
 A Death Penalty Commutation, Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2012, at A20. 
34
 Andrew Cohen, The Death Penalty: Why We Fight for Equal Justice, THE ATLANTIC 
(Sept. 19, 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/09/the-death-penalty-
why-we-fight-for-equal-justice/245101/. 
35
 Andrew Cohen, The Looming Death of the Death Penalty, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 15, 
2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/12/the-looming-death-of-the-
death-penalty/249969/ (citing DPIC, THE DEATH PENALTY IN 2011: YEAR END REPORT 
(Dec. 2011), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/2011__Year__End.pdf). 
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Professor Ty Alper provocatively argued that two executions on the same 
night highlighted the death penalty’s immorality: Troy Davis’s, and, in Texas, that 
of Lawrence Brewer, a white supremacist convicted of killing James Byrd, Jr., a 
black man, by tying him to the back of his truck and dragging him to death.
36
  
Conceding the grotesqueness of Mr. Brewer’s crime and his unquestionable guilt, 
Alper quoted Mr. Byrd’s own sister’s words: “If I saw [Brewer] face to face, I’d 
tell him I forgive him for what he did.  Otherwise I’d be like him.”37  Proceeding to 
compare capital punishment to slavery in its “moral[] abhorren[ce],” Alper 
predicted—in words similar to Cohen’s—that “[y]ears from now … the death 
penalty will be condemned because of what it reflects about us, not the individuals 
the state has killed in our name.”38  Justice John Paul Stevens seems to have 
concluded as much when he argued that the Court’s decision in Baze would simply 
“generate [more] debate not only about [lethal injection protocols’] 
constitutionality … but also about the justification for the death penalty itself.”39 
A salient implication of all such critical observations, however, is that 
asserting the death penalty’s status as a law and morality question is one thing.  
Teasing out what categories of reasoning frame its moral dimensions is another.  
Against the backdrop of the preceding observations, in what sense does capital 
punishment reflect upon our society?  Or, in what sense is it like slavery,
 
grotesque 
and immoral, or a moral and practical failure—or not?  Taken together, in what 
                                                     
36
 Ty Alper, Why the Execution of a White Supremacist Murderer Matters Too, HUFF 
POST CRIME (Sept. 25, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ty-alper/why-the-execution-
of-a-wh_b_980122.html. 
37
 Id. (quoting Ms. Byrd). 
38
 Id. 
39
 Baze, 553 U.S. at 71 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).  As Professor 
Elisabeth Semel perceptively observes, “[a]ny analysis of Justice Stevens’s rejection of 
capital punishment in Baze cannot lose sight of the fact that his vote was indispensable to 
the Court’s revival of the death penalty in 1976.”  Semel, supra note 27, at 787.   
Moreover, addressing the American Law Institute’s 2009 withdrawal of its Model 
Penal Code’s death penalty section, referencing “intractable institutional and structural 
obstacles to ensuring a minimally adequate system for administering capital punishment,” 
Message from ALI Director Lance Liebman, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE (Oct. 23, 2009), 
http://www.ali.org/_news/10232009.htm (citing Report of the Council to the Membership 
of the American Law Institute on the Matter of the Death Penalty, AMERICAN LAW 
INSTITUTE (Apr. 15, 2009), http://www.ali.org/doc/Capital_Punishment_web.pdf), 
Professor Samuel Gross observed that new law students will “learn that this … group of 
smart lawyers and judges—the ones whose work they read every day—has said that the 
death penalty in the United States is a moral and practical failure.”  Adam Liptak, Group 
Gives Up Death Penalty Work, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2010, at A11 (quoting Professor Gross). 
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sense might such discourse reflect “the evolving standards of decency that mark 
the progress of a maturing society[?]”40  
B. Religious dimensions, and the Catholic tradition’s relevance 
As Part III argues, Catholic death penalty teaching can engage such 
questions because it employs categories of reasoning directly on point.
41
  Before 
testing that premise, a poignant historical irony adds color to it.  On the same day 
in April 2008, the Supreme Court decided Baze v. Rees and heard argument in 
Kennedy v. Louisiana.  All having voted to affirm Kentucky’s lethal injection 
protocol, the Court’s then-five Catholic justices—Chief Justice John G. Roberts 
and Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel 
A. Alito—proceeded to a White House dinner honoring Pope Benedict XVI on his 
first official visit to the U.S. as pope.
42
  This was an ironic capstone to the justices’ 
day, as the Catholic Church is among the most visible of religious bodies to 
criticize the contemporary death penalty, and specifically in the United States.
43
   
Whether Catholic critique of capital punishment affects individual justices’ 
jurisprudence is interesting as a speculative matter, especially because Catholics 
are now a 6-3 majority on the Court.
44
  It may well be irrelevant, in the sense that, 
                                                     
40
 Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 419 (quotation omitted). 
41
 Catholics make up approximately 23.9% of the U.S. population.  THE PEW FORUM 
ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, U.S. RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE SURVEY, SUMMARY OF KEY 
FINDINGS (June 2008) (available at http://religions.pewforum.org/reports). 
Two terminological notes: first, this Article employs church as an adjective, Church as 
a noun, which in most instances here abbreviates the “Roman Catholic Church,” this 
Article’s focus.  This is not meant to overlook that the Catholic Church is one among many 
Christian Churches.  Second, capitalization (Church vs. church) can imply certain 
theological premises, but none are intended here as this Article is not theological per se. 
42
 Court OKs Lethal Injections; Executions Back On, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 16, 
2008), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24158627/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts//. 
43
 B.A. Robinson, Policies of Religious Groups Towards the Death Penalty, 
RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE.ORG (Apr. 10, 2009), 
http://www.religioustolerance.org/execut7.htm.  See also UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF 
CATHOLIC BISHOPS, A CULTURE OF LIFE AND THE PENALTY OF DEATH: A STATEMENT OF 
THE UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS CALLING FOR AN END TO THE 
DEATH PENALTY (2005) [hereinafter, USCCB]. 
44
 Commentators took the historically significant fact of Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s 
appointment in 2009, bringing the Court’s Catholic membership to an unprecedented six 
sitting justices, as an occasion to address the relevance of justices’ religious affiliation.  
See, e.g., Frances Kissling, Are Six Catholics Too Many for the Supreme Court?, SALON, 
May 31, 2009, http://www.salon.com/opinion/feature/2009/05/31/supreme_court/ (last 
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as Justice Scalia once quipped in his inimitable way, “[j]ust as there is no 
‘Catholic’ way to cook a hamburger, I am hard-pressed to tell you of a single 
opinion of mine that would have come out differently if I were not Catholic.”45  
But suppose Catholic teaching does affect jurists’ personal reflection, even as they 
presumably prescind from applying it in a formal sense?
46
  Or, that it affects moral 
reflection on the death penalty by many among the near one-quarter of Americans 
who are Catholic, which research suggests is true.
47
  The questions then become: 
how does Catholic teaching affect such reflection; and how might Catholic 
teaching thus be relevant, analytically speaking, to the broad backdrop of U.S. 
death penalty jurisprudence?  This Article engages this second, analytical inquiry. 
But is this even an appropriate topic?  Catholic death penalty teaching 
consists of normative claims and moral arguments that church authorities hope will 
be considered in public policy decision-making.
48
  In contrast, U.S. death penalty 
jurisprudence consists of complex bodies of statutory and constitutional law.  So 
understood, one could argue that academic comparison of the Catholic and U.S. 
death penalty approaches is conceptually problematic, while applying certain 
                                                                                                                                      
visited Dec. 14, 2011).  See also Joan Alpert, Religion & the Supreme Court: five 
Catholics.  Two Protestants.  Two Jews.  Do the religious beliefs of justices influence their 
legal opinions?, MOMENT (September/October 2008). 
45
 Antonin Scalia, address at Villanova University, Oct. 16, 2007 (quoted in David 
O’Reilly, Scalia Opines on Faith and Justice, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Oct. 17, 2007, at 
B5.)  See also Alpert, supra note 44 (noting that “Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who frequently 
disagrees with Scalia, fell firmly into line with him on this one, saying in January 2008 
that, if the Jews who preceded her on the Court were known as ‘Jewish justices,’ she and 
[Justice Stephen G.] Breyer, by contrast ‘are justices who happen to be Jews.’”).  
46
 Does Justice Scalia’s denial just beg the question?  Compare George Kannar, The 
Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE L.J. 1297 (1990) (speculating how a 
structured, traditional pre-Vatican II Catholic upbringing affected Justice Scalia’s 
jurisprudence), with Donald L. Beschle, Catechism or Imagination: Is Justice Scalia’s 
Judicial Style Typically Catholic?, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1329 (1992) (disputing the 
characterization of Justice Scalia’s judicial style as prototypically Catholic). 
47
 See notes 12-13, supra, and accompanying text. 
48
 See, e.g., USCCB, supra note 43, at 6: 
As leaders of a community of faith and as participants in our democracy, we are 
committed to contribute to a growing civil dialogue and reassessment of the use 
of th[e] ultimate punishment.  The death penalty arouses deep passions and strong 
convictions.  People of goodwill disagree.  In these reflections, we offer neither 
judgment nor condemnation but instead encourage engagement and dialogue, 
which we hope may lead to re-examination and conversion.  Our goal is not just 
to proclaim a position, but to persuade Catholics and others to join us in working 
to end the use of the death penalty. 
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conclusions arising from this descriptive exercise would be constitutionally 
suspect.
49
  Yet, per the First Amendment, citizens may be religious, and express 
religious views in the public square.
50
  Religious bodies’ stances on broad social 
questions are therefore relevant, capital punishment being an example. 
Indeed, beside the fact that religion affects many Americans’ views on the 
death penalty,
51
 92% of U.S. adults “believe in the existence of God or a universal 
spirit,” with 56% describing religion in their lives as “very important” and 26% 
describing it as “somewhat important.” 52   Thus, inasmuch as “the ‘spirit of 
religion’ remains a powerful force in shaping the views and values of the 
American people,”53 religious sources of moral reasoning inform many citizens’ 
moral judgments.
54
  Given that context, and because death penalty jurisprudence 
                                                     
49
 U.S. CONST., amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”).  “The Religion Clauses apply to the 
States by incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Elk Grove Unified School Dist. 
v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 8 n.4 (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940)). 
50
 U.S. CONST., amend. I (“Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of 
speech . . . .”).  First Amendment protections of speech are likewise enforced against state 
action per the Fourteenth Amendment.  Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).  
As Professor William Marshall has argued, the free exercise of religion bears directly on 
the freedom of speech, and both have proper public dimensions—the “freedom of 
expression and free exercise provid[ing] a unitary protection for individual liberty.”  
William P. Marshall, Solving the Free Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as Expression, 67 
MINN. L. REV. 545, 546 (1982-1983) (reference omitted). 
51
 See notes 12-13, supra, and accompanying text. 
52
 THE PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, U.S. RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE 
SURVEY, RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND PRACTICES: DIVERSE AND POLITICALLY RELEVANT 5, 23 
(June 2008) (available at http://religions.pewforum.org/pdf/report2-religious-landscape-
study-full.pdf). 
53
 Id. at 1 (quoting Alexis de Tocqueville’s reading of our early republic). 
54
 Concerning correlation of rates of religious belief to religious tenets’ influence on 
moral reasoning, 78% of U.S. adults “agree that there are clear and absolute standards of 
right and wrong;” 29% “cite religious teachings and beliefs as their biggest influence.”  Id. 
at 62.  A larger share, 52%, “says that they look most to practical experience and common 
sense when it comes to questions of right and wrong,” but concerning sources of moral 
reasoning apart from personal experience, the 29% who cite religion dwarfs the 9% who 
cite “philosophy and reason,” and the 5% who cite “scientific information.”  Id.  (The 
remaining 4% fall in the “don’t know” or no-answer categories.  Id.)  That being said, the 
Pew survey also—and unsurprisingly—“confirms the close link between Americans’ 
religious affiliation, beliefs and practices, on the one hand, and their social and political 
attitudes, on the other. . . . The relationship between religion and politics is particularly 
strong with respect to political ideology and views on [certain] social issues . . . .”  Id. at 3. 
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both engages social mores and “necessarily embodies a moral judgment,” 55 
religious moral reasoning’s methodological orientation may assist in framing 
certain issues that that jurisprudence entails.  To this point, Professors Paul H. 
Robinson and John M. Darley have cited research indicating that “most judgments 
about criminal liability and punishment for serious wrongdoing are intuitional 
rather than reasoned.”56  To the extent that intuitions about justice also are both 
highly nuanced and widely shared across diverse demographic groups,
57
 various 
frames of moral reasoning, including religious ones, may foster critical reflection 
on otherwise-inchoate intuitions concerning capital punishment. 
Religion’s relevance stems from two further observations relating broad 
public attitudes to jurisprudence per se.  First, although moral reasoning is not the 
exclusive domain of religion or theology, the latter employ forms of moral 
reasoning.  Various authors have surveyed the terrain of religion, morality, and 
law.
58
  The point to stress here is that jurisprudence embraces a legal system’s 
“fundamental elements,” which includes “its ethical significance and adequacy[,] 
… bring[ing] together moral and legal philosophy.”59  Religion has made its own 
contributions to jurisprudence, as Professor Harold Berman has described.
60
  This 
                                                     
55
 Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 419 (quotation omitted). 
56
 Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications for Criminal 
Law and Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 1 (2007).     
57
 Id. at 57.     
58
 See, e.g., LAW AND RELIGION IN THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT (Peter 
Cane, Carolyn Evans, & Zoë Robinson eds., 2008); MARTHA NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF 
CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA’S TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY (2008); 
MICHAEL J. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND MORAL PERSPECTIVES 
(1997); JOHN WITTE, JR., AND JOEL A. NICHOLS, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT (3d. ed. 2011); Michael S. Moore, Four Reflections on Law 
and Morality, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1523 (2006). 
59
 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 711 (Bryan A. Garner, ed., abridged 8th ed. 2005) 
(defining “jurisprudence,” “ethical jurisprudence,” and “general jurisprudence”).  See also 
HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL 
TRADITION vi-vii (1983) (describing positivist jurisprudence’s analytical persuasion and 
expressly political implications; natural law jurisprudence’s theoretical, moral-
philosophical bent; and historicist jurisprudence’s focus on social theory). 
60
  See generally BERMAN, supra note 59, Part I: The Papal Revolution and the Canon 
Law (theorizing that law in the West underwent its most significant changes as a result of 
six revolutions, beginning with the “Papal Revolution” of 1075-1122, which coincided 
with the Gregorian Reform in the Catholic Church and its “new canon law”—itself the first 
modern legal system in the West—from which followed a host of secular legal systems that 
are predecessors of those we have today). 
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Article explores Kennedy’s moral and legal philosophy in its interface with a deep 
“integrative jurisprudence” that “emphasize[s] that law has to be believed in or it 
will not work; [that] it involves not only reason and will but also emotion, 
intuition, and faith.” 61   Because U.S. death penalty jurisprudence necessarily 
embodies moral judgment, it implicates such an integrative jurisprudence, existing 
against a cultural, historical, and legal backdrop suffused with religion. 
Second, religion is salient to death penalty jurisprudence given its own 
deep religious roots.  To start, it would be difficult to overstate the influence of the 
Bible’s lex talionis on Western moral norms regarding capital punishment.  The 
classical statement of the lex talionis appears in Exodus 21:23-24: “[where] 
damage ensues, the penalty shall be life for life . . . .”62  That influence also entails 
certain ambiguities, scholars noting that Jewish and Christian Scriptures’ views on 
the death penalty cut both ways, as it were.
63
  Many conclude, especially given 
modern historical-critical interpretation, that biblical texts taken as a whole are 
                                                     
61
 BERMAN, supra note 59, at vii.  Analogously, but with respect to capital punishment, 
Professor David Garland has characterized his recent study of the American death penalty 
as “a ‘law and society’ project that works in [two] directions—studying a social context to 
better understand a legal institution, but also using a legal institution to better understand 
society.”  GARLAND, supra note 3, at 16. 
62
 TANAKH: A NEW TRANSLATION OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES ACCORDING TO 
THE TRADITIONAL HEBREW TEXT (Jewish Publication Society, 1985).  See also id., Genesis 
9:6 (“Whoever sheds the blood of man, [b]y man shall his blood be shed; For in His image 
[d]id God make man.”).  For a detailed analysis of the lex talionis, see David Daube, Lex 
Talionis, in STUDIES IN BIBLICAL LAW 102 (1947, 1969; as reprinted in 3 BIBLICAL LAW 
AND LITERATURE 203 (Calum Carmichael ed., Collected Works of David Daube, 2003)). 
63
 Compare E. CHRISTIAN BRUGGER, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND ROMAN CATHOLIC 
MORAL TRADITION 60-62 (2003) (citing numerous death penalty prescriptions in the 
Torah), with JAMES J. MEGIVERN, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN HISTORICAL AND 
THEOLOGICAL SURVEY 12 (1997) (arguing that procedural and other protections in Jewish 
law effectively, and quite considerably, narrowed the death penalty’s applicable scope).   
The Christian Scriptures, or New Testament, also equivocate.  In Matthew’s Gospel 
Jesus affirms some commandments of the Mosaic law concerning killing and retaliation, 
but contravenes others.  Matthew 5:38-39a, 43-44, NEW AMERICAN BIBLE (Donald Senior, 
et al., trans. and eds. 1990) (“You have heard that it was said, ‘[a]n eye for an eye and a 
tooth for a tooth.’  But I say to you, offer no resistance to one who is evil . . . [and] [y]ou 
have heard that it was said, ‘[y]ou shall love your neighbor and hate your enemy.’  But I 
say to you, love your enemies, and pray for those who persecute you”).  But in Romans 
13:1-4, Saint Paul starkly defends the death penalty: “Let every person be subordinate to 
the higher authorities, for there is no authority except from God, and those that exist have 
been established by God. . . . But if you do evil, be afraid, for [authority] does not bear the 
sword without purpose; it is the servant of God to inflict wrath on the evildoer.” 
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equivocal about the death penalty.
64
  Early Christians may have been ambivalent in 
their own attitudes, as they would have interpreted biblical texts in light of the fact 
that Jesus’ execution was central to their belief, and that many of them faced the 
same fate as a persecuted minority in the pre-Constantine Roman Empire.
65
   
The Bible’s influence on capital punishment certainly survived antiquity: 
millennia-worth of its defenders have cited the Bible for its justification, from 
ancient Israelites, to Christian authorities, to modern citizens.
66
  Also, religious 
views on the death penalty evolved just as church and state developed, in tandem 
and in tension, together with their respective legal systems:
67
 “basic institutions, 
concepts, and values of Western legal systems have their sources in religious 
rituals, liturgies, and doctrines of the eleventh and twelfth centuries,” including 
“attitudes toward death, sin, punishment, [and] forgiveness.”68  Even if “religious 
attitudes and assumptions have changed fundamentally” since then, “legal 
institutions, concepts, and values that have derived from them still survive, often 
unchanged.”69  Indeed, executions remain highly ritualized, even quasi-religious.70 
Professor Stuart Banner has portrayed how religious intuitions powerfully 
informed this nation’s earliest death penalty.71  “Terror, Blood, and Repentance,” 
                                                     
64
 Richard H. Hiers, The Death Penalty and Due Process in Biblical Law, 81 U. DET. 
MERCY L. REV. 751, 834 (2004). 
65
 MEGIVERN, supra note 63, at 19. 
66
 BRUGGER, supra note 63, at 60; MEGIVERN, supra note 63, at 9.  See also Robinson, 
supra note 43 (citing the Southern Baptist Church Assembly’s recent declaration, based on 
biblical reference, of “God[’s] authoriz[ation of] capital punishment for murder after the 
Noahic Flood, validating its legitimacy in human society.” (citation omitted)).  
67
 BERMAN, supra note 59, at 50, 87 (observing that legal systems per se developed in 
both the church and in secular states in the early twelfth century and after, with “[t]he 
creation of modern legal systems [being], in the first instance, a response to revolutionary 
change within the church and in the relation of the church to the secular authorities.”). 
68
 Id. at 165.   
69
 Id. 
70
 Leigh B. Bienan, Anomalies: Ritual and Language in Lethal Injection Regulations, 
35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 857, 872 (2008) (describing “rituals and traditions” of U.S. 
executions, including “statements regarding the prisoner’s choice of his method of death, 
his choice of his final meal, the visit of the religious figure, the solicitation of repentance, 
the reporting of the prisoner’s last words, and the donning of ceremonial clothes.”). 
71
 STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 5-23 (2002). 
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the first chapter in his history of the U.S. death penalty, concludes by poignantly 
observing that the death penalty in the colonial and early national eras “fulfilled 
the moral expectations of most colonial Americans.”72  Others have documented 
religion’s influence on capital punishment well into the present. 73   And the 
relevance (or not) of religious moral reasoning even extends to Supreme Court 
jurisprudence: Justice Stevens cited anti-death penalty amici briefs filed by U.S. 
religious communities in 2002 in Atkins v. Virginia, which barred the death penalty 
for persons who have mental retardation.
74
   
On the other hand, Chief Justice Roberts’s plurality opinion in Baze v. 
Rees noted that, while “[r]easonable people of good faith disagree on the morality 
and efficacy of capital punishment,” the precise questions before the Court often 
require distinguishing the constitutionality of execution procedures from “moral[ 
or] religious” perspectives on the death penalty.75  But what of the moral judgment 
that, per a majority in Kennedy, necessarily informs death penalty jurisprudence?
76
  
Furor over Troy Davis’s execution signals this question about death penalty 
jurisprudence’s precise moral contours.77  For example, when courts conclude that 
review of an innocence claim has met due process requirements, yet substantial 
questions remain about the defendant’s guilt and/or matters like the role of race in 
adjudicating it, how divorced is the constitutionality of procedure from capital 
punishment’s morality per se, especially given the notion that “death is 
different”?78  This Article explores the death penalty as law and morality question, 
in light of religious and secular moral norms, and the law’s own normative values. 
                                                     
72
 Id. at 23. 
73
 See generally, e.g., Owens et al., supra note 9; THE PEW FORUM, supra note 12; 
Robert F. Drinan, Religious Organizations and the Death Penalty, 9 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 171 (2000). 
74
 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21 (citing opposition to the death penalty for mentally 
retarded persons by “widely diverse religious communities within the United States”). 
75
 Baze, 553 U.S. at 61, 41 (plurality opinion) (quotation omitted). 
76
 See Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 419. 
77
 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 34 (critically observing, in the wake of Mr. Davis’s case 
and that of Duane Buck, whose execution was blocked by the Supreme Court in a rebuke to 
Texas’s handling of racial testimony by an expert witness, that fighting against condemned 
inmates’ relief “is saying that [a state’s] interest in the finality of its capital judgments is 
more important than the accuracy of its capital verdicts.”). 
78
 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (plurality opinion) (observing that 
“[w]hile … the infliction of the death penalty [does not p]er se violate[] the Constitution’s 
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C. Capital punishment, moral reasoning, and comparative law 
In studying the death penalty this way, this Article employs insights from 
comparative law, which asks whether different legal systems or traditions so 
diverge as to preclude substantive comparison.
79
  As Professor Esin Örücü argues, 
“[c]omparative law is about communication, and, by providing [a] language [for 
it,] … allows legal scholars to enter into holistic communication.”80  Facilitating 
such holistic communication is the goal of comparing the moral reasoning 
language of U.S. death penalty jurisprudence, via Kennedy v. Louisiana, with 
Catholic death penalty teaching.  Especially because the latter envisions itself as 
speaking “beyond the confines of the Catholic community, … [to a] global 
audience of ‘all people of good will,’”81 such a comparison can support robust 
discourse about capital punishment’s moral contours today. 82   But because 
skepticism concerning these premises may remain, following is a juxtaposition of a 
critical passage from Kennedy with a synopsis of Catholic teaching.
83
  This reveals 
several similarities, supporting the claim that substantive comparison is feasible.  
                                                                                                                                      
ban on cruel and unusual punishments, … the penalty of death is different in kind from any 
other punishment imposed under our system of criminal justice.”) (citations omitted). 
79
 See generally, e.g., PETER DE CRUZ, COMPARATIVE LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD 
(2007); COMPARATIVE LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Andrew Harding & Esin Örücü eds., 
2002). 
80
 Esin Örücü, Unde Venit, Quo Tendit Comparative Law?, in Harding & Örücü, 
supra note 79, at 15. 
81
 Kenneth R. Himes, Introduction, MODERN CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING: 
COMMENTARIES & INTERPRETATIONS 5 (Kenneth R. Himes et al., eds., 2005). 
82
 Professor William Twining endorses including religious law and entities’ relevance 
to comparative law, Globalisation and Comparative Law, in COMPARATIVE LAW: A 
HANDBOOK 71 (Esin Örücü & David Nelken eds., 2007), and Professors Andrew Harding 
and Esin Örücü, supra note 79, at ix, argue that “comparativists[] will regard religion as 
part of the underlying deeply seated processes that influence the evolving shape of law.” 
83
 Professor Peter De Cruz has identified linguistic and terminological difficulties, 
cultural differences, and risks of superimposing common legal patterns or one’s own lens 
of expectations as among the difficulties inherent in comparing different legal systems and 
traditions—as this Article does—but also argues that such potential pitfalls should not 
preclude a comparison even of vastly different entities.  DE CRUZ, supra note 79, at 219. 
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Preliminary Comparison: Kennedy v. Louisiana
84
 and Catholic Teaching
85
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
                                                     
84
 Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 419-20 (brackets, paragraph breaks, and quotations omitted) 
85
 CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH §§ 2265-67 (rev. ed., United States Catholic 
Conference-Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1997) [hereinafter, CCC] (paragraph breaks and 
quotations omitted); USCCB, supra note 43, at 4 (the italicized, bracketed text above). 
A Summary of Catholic Teaching 
The efforts of the state to curb the spread of 
behavior harmful to people’s rights and to 
the basic rules of civil society correspond to 
the requirement of safeguarding the common 
good. Legitimate public authority has the 
right and the duty to inflict punishment 
proportionate to the gravity of the offense.  
Punishment has the primary aim of 
redressing the disorder introduced by the 
offense . . . [and], in addition to defending 
public order and protecting people’s safety, 
has a medicinal purpose: as far as possible, it 
must contribute to the correction of the 
guilty party.  Assuming that the guilty 
party’s identity and responsibility have been 
fully determined, [our] traditional teaching 
… does not exclude recourse to the death 
penalty, if this is the only possible way of 
effectively defending human lives against 
the unjust aggressor.  If, however, nonlethal 
means are sufficient to defend and protect 
people’s safety from the aggressor, authority 
will limit itself to such means, as these are 
more in keeping with the concrete 
conditions of the common good and are 
more in conformity to the dignity of the 
human person.  [The sanction of death, when 
it is not necessary to protect society, . . . 
diminishes all of us.]  Today, in fact, as a 
consequence of the possibilities which the 
state has for effectively preventing crime, by 
rendering one who has committed an offense 
incapable of doing harm—without definitely 
taking away from him the possibility of 
redeeming himself—the cases in which the 
execution of the offender is an absolute 
necessity are very rare, if not practically 
nonexistent.  
Kennedy 
[T]he Eighth Amendment’s protection 
against excessive or cruel and unusual 
punishments flows from the basic precept of 
justice that punishment for a crime should be 
graduated and proportioned to the offense.  
Whether this requirement has been fulfilled is 
determined . . . by the norms that currently 
prevail[, and] . . . from the evolving standards 
of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society.  This is because the 
standard of extreme cruelty is not merely 
descriptive, but necessarily embodies a moral 
judgment.  The standard itself remains the 
same, but its applicability must change as the 
basic mores of society change. Evolving 
standards of decency must embrace and 
express respect for the dignity of the person, 
and the punishment of criminals must 
conform to that rule[, being] . . . justified 
under one or more of three principal 
rationales: rehabilitation, deterrence, and 
retribution.  It is the last of these, retribution, 
that most often can contradict the law’s own 
ends.  This is of particular concern . . . in 
capital cases. When the law punishes by 
death, it risks its own sudden descent into 
brutality, transgressing the constitutional 
commitment to decency and restraint.  For 
these reasons . . . capital punishment must be 
limited to those offenders who commit a 
narrow category of the most serious crimes 
and whose extreme culpability makes them 
the most deserving of execution.  Though the 
death penalty is not invariably 
unconstitutional, the Court insists upon 
confining the instances in which the 
punishment can be imposed. 
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The preceding juxtaposition illustrates how both Eighth Amendment death 
penalty jurisprudence and Catholic death penalty teaching employ the language of 
law and morality, incorporating broad themes of jurisprudence concerning 
authority, tradition, the interests of civil society, and the purposes of punishment.  
Kennedy begins with a threshold affirmance of the death penalty’s 
constitutionality, but articulates a firm presumption limiting its scope to a narrow 
category of offenders and offenses, circumscribed by notions of seriousness, 
extreme culpability, and moral dessert.  The Catholic emphasis on procedural 
safeguards exists alongside concern about racial bias and a diminished humanity 
perceived to result from excessively retributive moral intuitions.  Both articulate a 
presumption of restraint in its application, striving to balance broad moral values 
with appropriate procedural rules.  Moreover, a reader who did not know that the 
second statement is from a religious entity might assume it to be a statutory 
preamble or policy statement comprising part of a legislative history. 
Comparative legal theory addressing law and religion can explain this 
phenomenon.  For, notwithstanding the fact that disestablishment is a key feature 
of the U.S. legal system, the history of “the law” per se in the West, to which U.S. 
jurisprudence is an heir, is inextricably linked with religion, as Professor Berman 
has extensively documented.
86
  If anything, that presumably is among the historical 
factors giving rise to the American ethos of both disestablishment and free 
exercise.
87
  In any event, decades before Professor Berman’s contribution to the 
                                                     
86
 See generally BERMAN, supra note 59 (documenting the Western legal tradition’s 
emergence from the dialectical relationship between secular and religious ideas and 
institutions).  See also JAVIER MARTÍNEZ-TORRÓN, ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW AND CANON 
LAW: CANONICAL ROOTS OF THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 168 (1998) (studying how 
religion and its “moral concepts were transplanted into the legal world”). 
87
 In a recent, incisive study, Professor Alan Brownstein has endorsed reading the 
religion clauses as “support[ing] and reinforce[ing] each other in critical ways,” so as to 
“assign[] considerable value to the right to practice one’s faith free from state interference 
while acknowledging that the affirmative support of religion by government risks the 
sacrifice of important liberty and equality interests of both believers and non-believers.”  
The Religion Clauses as Mutually Reinforcing Mandates: Why the Arguments for 
Rigorously Enforcing the Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause Are Stronger 
When Both Clauses Are Taken Seriously, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1701, 1705 (2011).  
Professor Brownstein’s argument is not without support.  As a unanimous Supreme Court 
recently observed in Hosanna-Tabor, while “there can be ‘internal tension ... between the 
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause,’” that is not always the case—e.g., 
where, as in Hosanna-Tabor, the government interferes with a religious group’s 
employment of its ministers, such that the clauses operate in tandem.  2012 WL 75047 at 
*7 (quoting Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677 (1971) (plurality opinion)).  The Court 
proceeded to compare English practices with the diverse approaches to both establishment 
and free exercise in our colonial and early national experience, observing that the latter 
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field, Professor Stephan Kuttner studied the same phenomenon, characterizing as 
“interpenetration” the historically dialectical relationship between Catholic canon 
law and secular Western law.
 88
  This term aptly helps explain why U.S. death 
penalty jurisprudence and Catholic death penalty teaching—as sketched out above 
in preliminary form, and as the following analysis fleshes out—sound with a 
similar tone, if not speak in a similar tongue.  The point is not that one mimics, 
much less replicates, the other.  Rather, because they share a deep substantive 
tradition, their frames of moral reasoning use similar operative premises.  They 
are, that is, translatable.  As Professor David Daube has observed, 
[r]eligion borrows from law freely, continuously and 
from early on, hence can greatly enlighten us as to 
legal life in successive periods.  Law is perhaps 
partially responsible for the very existence of a 
normative side of religion—duties, procedures, 
sanctions—as well as particular manifestations of it: 
quite compatible with equal indebtedness the other way 
around.
89
 
What, then, do U.S. death penalty jurisprudence á la Kennedy and Catholic 
death penalty teaching each say, and what might they say to one another? 
 
II.   U.S. DEATH PENALTY JURISPRUDENCE 
No “American position” on capital punishment can be stated as succinctly 
as one finds in the Catholic Catechism.  Its history of practice by various states and 
                                                                                                                                      
both arose from and reacted against that history, all of this being the “background [against 
which] the First Amendment was adopted.”  Id. at 7-8.  Also see generally JOHN WITTE, 
JR., & JOEL A. NICHOLS, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT (3d 
ed. 2011); KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION (2006). 
88
 Stephan Kuttner, Some Considerations of the Role of Secular Law and Institutions in 
the History of Canon Law, 2 SCRITTI DI SOCIOLOGIA E POLITICA IN ONORE DI LUIGI STURZO 
351 (1953), reprinted in STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL CANON LAW VI-351 
(1990) (describing the “general interpenetration” of ecclesiastical and secular law from the 
fourth to sixteenth centuries as “fundamental” in Western legal and administrative systems 
and governance structures; doctrines on just war and the use of force; the development of 
constitutional and international law; and the law governing contracts, corporations, wills 
and estates, marriage, and private law).  Crucially, this was a dialectical process, with 
components of Catholic canon law and secular Roman law influencing one another.  Id. at 
354-55.  See also BERMAN, supra note 59, at 144 n.53, 187 n.44, 189 & n.46, 190-92 & 
nn.48-50, 201 & n.7, 205 n.16, 207 n.22 (citing Professor Kuttner’s work). 
89
 Biblical and Postbiblical Law, in 3 BIBLICAL LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 62, 
at 3. 
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the federal government is profoundly diverse,
90
 and the constitutional framework 
governing those practices is “exceedingly complex,” as Justice Alito observed in 
Kennedy.
91
  (Others less euphemistically characterize Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence as “embarrassing,” or “a train wreck.”92)  Nevertheless, it is possible 
to sketch a general outline of U.S. death penalty jurisprudence through reference to 
historical highlights, the role of the Model Penal Code’s recently withdrawn capital 
sentencing section (which many death penalty jurisdictions’ statutes follow to 
some degree
93
), and its post-Kennedy constitutional status. 
A. Historical background 
Evocative of Professor Kuttner’s theory of interpenetration, early 
American law included “vaguely and inaccurately remembered fragments of 
common law, local law, Mosaic law … and Roman law.”94  U.S. death penalty 
jurisprudence likewise emerged from the Western tradition’s broad legal, political, 
and religious history.
95
  Just as “capital punishment [remains] constitutional” in the 
United States today,
96
  law and morality, together with religion in particular, have 
                                                     
90
 See generally, DPIC, Part I: History of the Death Penalty, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/part-i-history-death-penalty (last visited Dec. 9, 2011). 
91
 Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 452 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
92
 Stinneford, supra note 28, at 1740 (quotations omitted). 
93
 See generally Russell Dean Covey, Exorcizing Wechsler’s Ghost: The Influence of 
the Model Penal Code on Death Penalty Sentencing Jurisprudence, 31 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 189 (2004). 
94
 KERMIT L. HALL, PAUL FINKELMAN, & JAMES W. ELY, JR., AMERICAN LEGAL 
HISTORY: CASES AND MATERIALS 37 (3d ed., 2005).  See also id. at 2 (“Americans created 
their legal order in a spirit of eclectic opportunism, drawing from various sources of law 
and devising new rules of law when they found nothing suitable in existing systems.”). 
95
 See generally BANNER, supra note 71; DPIC, Part I: History of the Death Penalty, 
supra note 90 (observing that, while European settlers “brought [with them] the practice of 
capital punishment,” specific “death penalty [laws] varied from colony to colony,” though 
among the first, in Virginia in 1612, were “the Divine, Moral and Martial Laws, which 
provided the death penalty for even minor offenses”). 
96
 Baze, 553 U.S. at 47 (plurality opinion) (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 177 (joint opinion 
of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)).  Cf. Kennedy, 554 U.S. 420 (“Though the death 
penalty is not invariably unconstitutional, the Court insists on confining the instances in 
which the punishment can be imposed.”) (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153).   
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been an important subtext from its earliest history to the present.
 97
  Owing to 
English common law practice, the death penalty was imposed in the colonies and 
the early republic for a variety of offenses against persons, property, and 
morality.
98
  Up to the present, U.S. religious groups have stood on both sides of the 
death penalty debate,
99
 while the beliefs of those groups continue to influence their 
adherents’ views. 100   Presumably that is neither culturally insignificant nor 
politically irrelevant given that thirty-four states, the federal government, and the 
U.S. military have capital sentencing laws in force, and over 3,200 inmates occupy 
the nation’s death rows, with California—the nation’s most populous state—
housing the nation’s largest death row population, at over 700.101   
Of pivotal historical and legal significance was the Supreme Court’s 1972 
invalidation, in Furman v. Georgia, of all existing capital sentencing schemes on 
the ground that its arbitrary and capricious administration violated the Eighth 
Amendment.
102
  Crucial to the decision was its invocation of “evolving standards 
of decency” to find unconstitutional, as administered, a sanction that had been in 
place for centuries.
103
  Four years later, in Gregg v. Georgia and companion cases 
                                                     
97
 MEGIVERN, supra note 63, at 299-335 (cataloguing biblical and other religious 
influences on capital punishment transplanted from Europe to the early American context); 
see also BANNER, supra note 71, ch. 1; Owens & Elshtain, supra note 9. 
98
 BANNER, supra note 71, at 5-9. 
99
 Robinson, supra note 43; Part II: History of the Death Penalty, DPIC, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/part-ii-history-death-penalty (last visited Dec. 9, 2011) 
(surveying religious organizations’ views on the death penalty). 
100
 See notes 12-13, supra, and accompanying text. 
101
 DPIC, Facts About the Death Penalty (Jan. 6, 2012), 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf.   
102
 Furman’s precise holding is hard to pin down, as it yielded nine opinions spanning 
over 200 pages.  408 U.S. at 238-470.  The opinion authored by three justices four years 
later in Gregg v. Georgia summarized Furman as invalidating statutes prone to yield 
arbitrary and capricious death sentences—i.e., those which allowed “juries [to] impose[] 
the death sentence in a way that could only be called freakish.”  Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206-07 
(joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).  Later revisiting and upholding 
Georgia’s capital punishment statute, the Court quoted Gregg’s rule that the “‘discretion … 
afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human 
life should be taken or spared … must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize 
the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.’”  Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 874 
(1983) (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189). 
103
 Furman, 408 U.S. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring opinion), 269-70 (Brennan, J., 
concurring opinion); 327, 329 (Marshall, J., concurring opinion) (all citing Trop, 356 U.S. 
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from Florida and Texas, the Court upheld statutes that had been revised to satisfy 
Furman’s requirement of rationality and consistency in capital proceedings.104  
Rationality and consistency in weighing the ultimate punishment bespeak moral 
reasoning, as do “evolving standards of decency” as a substantive constitutional 
principle.  Indeed, arguably advancing a rule that capital adjudication proceed as a 
moral reasoning enterprise, the Court upheld statutes that adequately channeled 
sentencing discretion,
105
 but voided those providing for mandatory death 
sentences.
106
  While the latter approaches may have addressed unbridled discretion, 
pluralities of the Court concluded they impermissibly removed the ultimate 
(moral?) question of death—and the individualized determination that the Court 
saw that that question requires—from any discretionary analysis whatsoever.107 
Moreover, Professor Banner has argued that capital punishment’s 
“comeback” in popularity and practice after Gregg owed to two broad factors 
operative in social consciousness.  First, “capital punishment was a moral 
imperative,” an extension of the principle that “[t]he criminal law ‘must remind us 
of the moral order by which alone we can live[.]’”108  Second, this abstract notion 
of moral order bore overt expression in the sense that inflicting capital punishment 
met a need “for a collective condemnation of crime.”109   In both respects the 
revived American death penalty tapped into certain notions of moral order and the 
common good that also inform the Catholic worldview, as Part III will argue.  
Professor Banner’s thesis is not stale; as Professor Garland more recently argued: 
We need to think about capital punishment not as a 
lumbering dinosaur with an ancient physiology but 
instead as a mobile assemblage of practices, 
discourses, rituals, and representations that has 
evolved over time in response to the demands of the 
                                                                                                                                      
at 101 (plurality opinion), which had applied the evolving standards of decency principle 
not to capital punishment, but to a statute providing for the expatriation of one convicted by 
military court martial, and thereafter dishonorable discharged, for wartime desertion). 
104
 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206-07 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). 
105
 See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 US. 262 (1976). 
106
 See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 
U.S. 325 (1976). 
107
 See Woodson, 428 U.S. 280. 
108
 BANNER, supra note 71, at 282-83 (quoting WALTER BERNS, FOR CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT: CRIME AND THE MORALITY OF THE DEATH PENALTY 173 (1979)). 
109
 Id. at 283. 
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social environment and the pressure of competing 
forces.  Doing so reminds us that capital punishment 
has a history that shapes its forms as well as its uses.  
And it obliges us to take account of its contemporary 
incarnation—the institutional arrangements, legal 
procedures, discursive figures, and dramatic forms that 
actually exist today.
110
 
Today’s death penalty, then, requires analytical attention to its resonance with 
integrative jurisprudence, to recall Professor Berman’s phrase.111 
Full analysis of current capital jurisdictions’ death penalty statutes exceeds 
this Article’s scope.  However, brief discussion of Section 210.6 of the Model 
Penal Code (MPC) is illuminating because statutory schemes like those upheld in 
Gregg took their cue from it,
112
 and many still rely, at least in part, on its 
framework, despite its being withdrawn by the American Law Institute in 2009.
113
  
Germane to this Article, Section 210.6 requires factfinders to assess properly 
“moral” categories concerning an offender’s relative depravity, culpability, and 
dessert of the ultimate punishment.  Key MPC features that are a mainstay of many 
statutes include its categories of death penalty-eligible homicides and mens rea 
specifications;
114
 its framework of aggravating and mitigating factors for weighing 
death versus life imprisonment;
115
 and its provision for bifurcated proceedings, 
which arguably focus attention on the moral weight of a sentencing decision in its 
own right, apart from a legal finding of guilt.
116
  Kennedy v. Louisiana approvingly 
referenced such frameworks with respect to capital murder, but concluded they 
                                                     
110
 GARLAND, supra note 3, at 18-19. 
111
 See note 61, supra, and accompanying text. 
112
 Gregg extensively referenced the MPC.  See 428 U.S. at 185, 189, 191, 194, 195 
(joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).  On its role in capital sentencing 
statues, see, e.g., BANNER, supra note 23, at 269-270; Covey, supra note 110; Robinson & 
Dubber, supra note 9, at 325. 
113
 Concerning the MPC’s role in capital sentencing statutes following the American 
Law Institute’s withdrawal of Section 210.6, see Franklin E. Zimring, Pulling the plug on 
capital punishment: The American Law Institute withdraws approval for standards it 
created, raising doubts about the legitimacy of execution, NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, Dec. 
7, 2009, available at 
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202436026535&slreturn=1&hbxlogin
=1 (last visited Nov. 1, 2010). 
114
 MPC § 210.2(1)-(2). 
115
 Id. § 210.6(3)-(4). 
116
 Id. § 210.6(2). 
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should not be applied or refashioned for purposes of nonhomicide crimes.
117
  
Nonetheless, such frameworks’ moral premises did carry the day in Kennedy’s 
analysis, with sweeping effect. 
B. Eighth Amendment jurisprudence in Kennedy v. Louisiana 
At its core, Kennedy held that the Eighth Amendment “bars … the death 
penalty for the rape of a child where the crime did not result, and was not intended 
to result, in death of the victim.”118  More broadly, and evoking without naming the 
lex talionis, it distinguished “between intentional first-degree murder on the one 
hand and nonhomicide crimes against individual persons, even including child 
rape, on the other,” arguing that, while “[t]he latter crimes may be devastating in 
their harm,” they are unequal to homicide “‘in terms of moral depravity and of the 
injury to the person and to the public.’”119  The Court thus did not limit its moral 
analysis to the petitioner or those like him, but applied an expansive moral 
reasoning.  As Professor Elisabeth Semel has argued, Kennedy’s analysis relies on 
“a moral core” reminiscent of the penetrating—even if not then majority-
forming—readings of the Eighth Amendment by Justices William J. Brennan and 
Thurgood Marshall.
120
  The following analysis examines that core, focusing on 
how the decision: (1) frames the fundamental issue before the Court in moral 
terms; (2) emphasizes moral dimensions of Eighth Amendment doctrine; and (3) 
applies that jurisprudence in a manner that bespeaks the justices’ own moral 
agency.
 121
  To demonstrate how the text as a whole is an exercise in disputed, and 
disputable, judicial moral reasoning, the analysis discusses the dissent in tandem. 
1. Kennedy’s moral tone and context 
A threshold textual analysis supports the premise that Kennedy is morally 
focused.  The majority opinion employs formulations of the word “moral” eight 
times; the dissent does so eleven times.
122
  Those nineteen formulations of “moral” 
                                                     
117
 See Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 440-41. 
118
 Id. at 413. 
119
 Id. at 438 (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 598 (plurality opinion)). 
120
 See Semel, supra note 27, at 167 & nn.312, 315. 
121
 Corresponding to each focus area, subsection (1) treats Part I of Kennedy, 
especially 554 U.S. at 413, 418, subsection (2) treats Part II of Kennedy, id. at 419-21, and 
subsection (3) treats Parts III-V of Kennedy, id. at 422-47. 
122
 Compare Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 418, 419, 427, 435, 437, 438 (twice), 443, with id. 
(Alito, J., dissenting) at 452, 459, 461, 466 (four times), 467 (twice), 469 (twice). 
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represent an approximate 70% appearance rate compared with iterations of the 
conceptually analogous “evolving standards of decency,” which appear fifteen 
times in the majority opinion and twelve times in the dissent.
123
  By way of 
comparison, references to proportionality and formulations thereof, which forms 
the substantive core of Eighth Amendment analysis, occur nineteen times (sixteen 
times in the majority opinion, three times in the dissent)—i.e., just as frequently as 
formulations of “moral.”124  How, though, does this get fleshed out? 
The majority opinion sets a moral tone early on, proceeding from a brief 
summary of its holding to aver that the petitioner’s brutal rape of his eight-year-old 
stepdaughter “cannot be recounted … in a way sufficient to capture in full the hurt 
and horror inflicted on his victim or to convey the revulsion society, and the jury 
that represents it, sought to express by sentencing [him] to death.”125  Following a 
gruesome recitation of facts that would arouse moral indignation in any decent 
person,
126
 it shifts to an ethical assessment of those details’ legal significance, 
characterizing the judgment rendered by the Louisiana court being reviewed as 
having “reasoned[ that] the rape of a child is unique in terms of the harm it inflicts 
upon the victim and our society.”127  Kennedy’s own reasoning is “moral,” then, in 
a first sense, to the extent that the Court contextualizes the case as turning on a 
                                                     
123
 Compare id. (majority opinion) at 419 (four times), 420, 421, 434, 435 (twice), 438, 
439, 441, 446 (twice), 447, with id. (Alito, J., dissenting) at 447, 448 (three times), 452, 
454, 455, 458, 459, 460 (twice), 467.  This analysis includes variations of “values” as a 
general synonym for “standards” (of decency), but does not include equivocal uses of the 
word “standard” in the sense more typical of legal writing, e.g., “standards that would 
guide a [death penalty case] decisionmaker so the penalty is … not imposed in an arbitrary 
way,” id. at 439. 
124
 Compare id. (majority opinion) at 419, 420, 421, 424 (twice), 426, 427 (twice), 
428, 429, 430 (twice), 435, 438, 441, 446, with id. (Alito, J., dissenting) at 449, 450, 453.  
While references to “the Eighth Amendment” appear twenty-five times in the majority 
opinion, twenty-two times in the dissent.  Compare id. (majority opinion) at 412 (twice), 
413, 418, 419 (six times), 420 (twice), 421 (twice), 424, 426 (twice), 427, 428, 434 (three 
times), 435, 437, 446, with id. (Alito, J., dissenting) at 447, 448 (three times), 449 (twice), 
450, 451 n.1, 452, 454, 461 (twice), 462, 464 (twice), 465 (twice), 466, 467, 469 (three 
times).  But many such references exist for citation purposes, multiple appearances within 
the course of several sentences, not to mention in formal citations per se, supporting this 
premise.  Thus, that variations on “moral,” which is a distinctive substantive theme, occur 
approximately 40% as frequently as often-boilerplate recitations of the constitutional 
provision applicable to the case seems not insignificant. 
125
 Id. at 413 
126
 See id. at 413-15. 
127
 Id. at 418 (citing State v. Kennedy, 957 So. 2d 757, 781 (La. 2007) (Kennedy I)). 
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proportional assessment of “unique” forms of harm extending to child rape victims 
and those charged with protecting them.
128
  Assessing harm as a basis for judging 
the proportionality—and thus constitutionality—of a particular punishment ipso 
facto implies moral reasoning.  Moreover, this “common good” dimension to the 
Court’s framing of the issue recalls moral dimensions of death penalty discourse 
described in Part I, and resonates with the Catholic perspective, as Part III asserts. 
The dissent also begins with a moral tone, but with different effect, 
objecting to the majority’s “sweeping” and “[un]sound” holding 
no matter how young the child, no matter how many 
times the child is raped, no matter how many children 
the perpetrator rapes, no matter how sadistic the crime, 
no matter how much physical or psychological trauma 
is inflicted, and no matter how heinous the perpetrator’s 
prior criminal record may be.
129
   
The dissent underscores the “grievous[]” harm not just to “any victim” of rape—
especially children—but to “society[] … as well,” given pernicious long-term 
effects such as “substance abuse, dangerous sexual behaviors[,] … inability to 
relate to others on an interpersonal level, and psychiatric illness.”130  It continues: 
The harm that is caused to the victims and to society at 
large by the worst child rapists is grave.  It is the 
judgment of the Louisiana lawmakers and those in an 
increasing number of other States that these harms 
justify the death penalty.  The Court provides no 
cogent explanation why this legislative judgment 
should be overridden.  Conclusory references to 
“decency,” “moderation,” “restraint,” “full progress,” 
and “moral judgment” are not enough. . . . [T]he worst 
child rapists exhibit the epitome of moral depravity[,] 
and . . . child rape inflicts grievous injury on victims 
and on society in general.
131
 
                                                     
128
 See note 6, supra (citing various definitions of “moral” as, e.g., the “expressi[o]n[ 
of] … a conception of right behavior,” as well as that which is “operative on one’s 
conscience or ethical judgment,” or broadly pertains to the “perceptual or psychological”).  
Specifically, the majority ascribes to Kennedy I, 957 So. 2d at 781, the proposition that 
“[b]ecause children are a class that need special protection,” the harm that child rape 
inflicts “upon [both] the victim and our society” is “unique,” such that precedent 
precluding the death penalty for the rape of an adult woman should not necessarily 
preclude it for child rape.  Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 418 (quotation omitted; emphasis added). 
129
 Id. at 447 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
130
 Id. at 468-69 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
131
 Id. at 469 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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Both opinions’ juxtaposition of tone and context introduces a critical 
dimension of reading Kennedy as a text of judicial moral reasoning.  The Court is 
unified in affirming the case’s moral salience; both opinions allude to if not display 
“moral outrage” and “capital emotions,” to use phrases scholars have employed to 
address capital child rape statutes.
132
  But the Court sharply divides as to how that 
salience should be addressed.  This Article argues that what the Court does in 
Kennedy—or in some respects fails to do—turns on moral intuitionism versus 
moral reasoning.  That is, how ought jurisprudence that necessarily embodies 
moral judgment translate moral intuitions, as exhibited in the texts cited above, 
into moral reasoning proper to jurisprudence per se?  That the dissent argues that 
putatively “conclusory” moral judgment is insufficient for the Court’s decision, 
even as it inveighs against insufficient accounting for child rape’s moral depravity, 
underscores that its signatories do see the issue as a moral one, but disagree as to 
the locus of authority in resolving it.
133
  The crucial question for the Court, relevant 
to larger death penalty discourse, is not whether moral judgment is the heart of the 
matter, but rather who the authoritative moral judge is, and what sources should 
guide that moral reasoning.  Kennedy’s summary of Eighth Amendment doctrine 
underscores this point, but leaves fiercely contested how to resolve it. 
2. Moral reasoning and Eighth Amendment doctrine 
As a threshold matter, “the Eighth Amendment’s protection against 
excessive or cruel and unusual punishments flows from the basic ‘precept of 
justice that punishment for [a] crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] 
offense.’”134  Proportionality analysis requires, at bottom, an exercise of moral 
reasoning.
135
  For, the majority continues, “whether th[e Constitution’s] 
                                                     
132
 Professor Susan Bandes has argued that Kennedy raises larger questions about our 
society’s use of the criminal law to both reflect and implement moral outrage over horrific 
crimes.  Susan A. Bandes, Child Rape, Moral Outrage, and the Death Penalty, 103 NW. U. 
L. REV. COLLOQUY 17 (2008).  See also Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Engaging 
Capital Emotions, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 355, 355-56 (arguing that capital 
punishment is not inappropriate for child rape, and that emotions “help[] to explain many 
features of capital-punishment jurisprudence … [because they] reflect the public’s moral 
perspective that certain crimes have profound emotional resonance.” (citations omitted)). 
133
 See notes 129-31 infra, and accompanying text. 
134
 Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 419 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 
(1910)). 
135
 See discussion of Professor Moore’s treatment of Eighth Amendment moral 
reasoning, supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.  See also Stinneford, supra note 17, 
at 961-62 (arguing that proportionality ultimately turns on a conception of retributive 
justice involving normative rather than utilitarian judgments).  
30 JURISPRUDENCE THAT NECESSARILY EMBODIES MORAL JUDGMENT:  
© 2012 Kurt M. Denk 
Draft accepted for publication, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. --- (forthcoming 2012/2013) 
 
proportionality requirement has been fulfilled” turns on “norms that ‘currently 
prevail,’” 136  with the “Amendment ‘draw[ing] its meaning from the evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’”137  Given this 
“whether” formulation, the Court’s analysis is, first, descriptive: does a 
punishment, assertedly proportionate to an offense, cohere with broad social 
mores?
138
  Professor Michael Moore names this “a third-person judgment” as it 
concerns “what some other group … believes is morally right.”139   
This is not the whole matter, though, implicating the above-noted problem 
concerning moral authority and moral reasoning sources.  Proportionality analysis 
turns on two considerations, which might be framed as the Court’s obligation to 
consult and then render moral judgments: (1) it must examine “‘objective indicia 
of society’s standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice’”140 
(hereinafter, “objective indicia analysis”); and (2) it must apply “standards 
elaborated by controlling precedents and by the Court’s own understanding and 
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s text, history, meaning, and purpose”141 
(hereinafter, “independent judgment analysis”).  The precise wording of the latter 
is unique to Kennedy—or was at the time.142  But both evoke Professor Berman’s 
“integrative jurisprudence,” which emphasizes that law must be believable if it is 
to be administrable, and that this translation involves “reason[,] … will[,] … 
emotion, intuition, and faith.”143 
                                                     
136
 Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 419 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311) (emphasis added). 
137
 Id. (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 101 (plurality opinion)) (brackets omitted). 
138
 Kennedy’s application of the two-prong test represents the critical rupture between 
the majority and the dissent, as discussed in subsection (c) below. 
139
 Moore, supra note 17, at 53 (emphasis added). 
140
 Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 421 (quoting Simmons, 543 U.S. at 563; citing Enmund, 458 
U.S. at 788; Coker, 443 U.S. at 593-97 (plurality opinion)). 
141
 Id. (citing Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797-801; Coker, 443 U.S. at 597-600 (plurality 
opinion); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 182-83 (joint op. of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)).  The 
dissent characterizes much of this dimension of the Court’s analysis as “not pertinent to the 
Eighth Amendment question at hand.”  Id. at 461 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
142
 The Court subsequently quoted this rendering of the independent judgment analysis 
in Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. at 2022. 
143
 BERMAN, supra note 59, at vii.  (Presumably, Professor Berman means not 
religious faith per se, but affective-intellectual assent to deeply valued norms.)  
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Here Kennedy is significant.  Because “[c]onsensus is not dispositive” (i.e., 
in the form of the objective indicia analysis),
144
 justices must proceed from a 
descriptive, “what-is” account to an interpretive exercise of dynamic moral 
reasoning.  Taken together, the two-pronged proportionality test is a hermeneutical 
exercise—hermeneutics itself a mode of analysis germane to the law, religion, and 
moral reasoning.
145
  For moving from “what-is” to “what shall be”—the latter in 
the sense of setting forth a rule of law—itself “necessarily embodies a moral 
judgment.”
146
  This is what Professor Moore calls “committed, first-person moral 
judgments,” which require grappling with “the nature of the rights protected by the 
Constitution.”
147
  On one hand, this precludes judges from imposing simply 
personal preferences or subjective views—though that is what the dissenting 
justices conclude the majority ends up doing.
148
  Yet it also requires, among other 
things, that they be “guided by [more than] the dry recitation of moral shibboleths 
accepted by others.”
149
  On the assumption that “surely first, foremost, and always, 
                                                     
144
 Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 421. 
145
 Generally speaking, hermeneutics concerns the interpretation and understanding of 
texts.  See generally Bjørn Ramberg and Kristin Gjesdal, Hermeneutics, THE STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Summer 2009 ed.), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/hermeneutics/ (last visited Dec. 21, 
2011).  In line with characterizing Kennedy as a text of judicial moral reasoning that taps 
into integrative jurisprudence, hermeneutics theory assists this Article’s analysis inasmuch 
as it addresses interpretation in both theology and the law.  Traditionally speaking, legal 
hermeneutics addressed “rules for filling in gaps in a codified law, and hence had a 
normative character.”  Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hermeneutics and Historicism, Supplement I 
in TRUTH AND METHOD 505-41, 505 (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall trans., 2d 
rev. ed. 1999).  This filling-in-of-gaps in a manner that has a distinctly normative character 
is what the Kennedy majority appears to be doing, and in this sense its project is both 
hermeneutical, and not inapposite the sort of enterprise that often occurs in theology, as 
Part III(C) will explore.  See id. at 510 (observing that “we can see in the three fields in 
which hermeneutics has played a part from the beginning—in the historical and 
philological sciences, in theology, and in jurisprudence—that the critique of historical 
objectivism or ‘positivism’ has given new importance to the hermeneutical aspect.”).  See 
also Francis J. Mootz, Faithful Hermeneutics, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 361, 363 (2009) 
(describing the relevance of Professor Gadamer’s work to hermeneutical theory in both the 
law and in theology, emphasizing that “[l]aw and religion are activities” that involve “norm 
creation” that is “historically-unfolding”). 
146
 See Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 419 (quotation omitted).     
147
 Moore, supra note 17, at 58, 62 (emphasis added). 
148
 See Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 469 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
149
 Moore, supra note 17, at 63. 
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the job of a judge is to judge,” Professor Moore speculated, before the Court 
decided Kennedy, that such judgments “might well … be[] considerably more 
nuanced and responsive to the facts of [a] case,” with judges having to “throw[] off 
… deference to the moral views of others.”
150
  As further analysis argues, the 
Court did exactly that in Kennedy.
151
  That this sort of jurisprudence can have the 
“dynamic” effect of precipitating further development of the Court’s jurisprudence 
may well be confirmed by Justice Thomas’s post-Kennedy dissent in Graham, 
which in its critical characterization of Kennedy’s moral reach arguably confirms 
that Kennedy, perhaps more than any case before it, contextualizes proportionality 
analysis at bottom as a moral undertaking, requiring Eighth Amendment 
interpreters to approach their task as dynamic moral agents.
152
 
That the Court in Kennedy defined its task as dynamic moral agency is 
also seen in how it defines evolving standards of decency—which, as a metaphor, 
itself implies dynamic process.  It is significant how much Kennedy turns on 
assertions and, per the dissent, counter-assertions concerning evolving standards of 
decency.
153
  Moreover, the majority opinion’s textual structure subsumes reciting 
                                                     
150
 Id. at 65 (citation omitted). 
151
 See the discussion of Kennedy’s application of the governing rules in subsection 
(3), infra.  Certainly the dissenting justices saw this as a case of “for worse,” as have 
critical commentators, including those who defend proportionality analysis generally.  See, 
e.g., Stinneford, supra note 17, at 922-23 (characterizing Kennedy’s  “fictionalized 
consensus … to support its own judgment” as “disingenuous,” and its “obvious 
manipulation [of its analysis] to reach its desired conclusion” posing the risk of 
“undermin[ing] public respect for judicial review and for the law.”).     
152
 As Justice Thomas described Kennedy, and the Court’s reliance on it in Graham, 
[t]he Court … openly claims the power not only to approve or disapprove 
of democratic choices in penal policy based on evidence of how society’s 
standards have evolved, but also on the basis of the Court’s independent 
perception of how those standards should evolve, which depends on what 
the Court concedes is necessarily ... a moral judgment regarding the 
propriety of a given punishment in today’s society.  [But, t]he categorical 
proportionality review the Court employs in capital cases thus lacks a 
principled foundation. The Court’s decision … is significant because it 
does not merely apply this standard—it remarkably expands its reach.  
For the first time in its history, the Court declares an entire class of 
offenders immune from a noncapital sentence using the categorical 
approach it previously reserved for death penalty cases alone. 
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2046 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 419) 
(internal quotation marks and paragraph break omitted; first and second emphases in 
original, third and forth emphases added). 
153
 See note 123 (cataloguing the Kennedy opinions’ respective references to evolving 
standards of decency). 
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the purposes of punishment to a sweeping assertion of the evolving standards of 
decency, rooted in a substantive conception of human dignity: 
Evolving standards of decency must embrace and 
express respect for the dignity of the person, and the 
punishment of criminals must conform to that rule. . . .  
As we shall discuss, punishment is justified under one 
or more of three principal rationales: rehabilitation, 
deterrence, and retribution. . . . It is the last of these, 
retribution, that most often can contradict the law’s own 
ends.  This is of particular concern when the Court 
interprets the meaning of the Eighth Amendment in 
capital cases.  When the law punishes by death, it risks 
its own sudden descent into brutality, transgressing the 
constitutional commitment to decency and restraint.
154
 
Parts II(c) and IV will explore the implications of the Court’s application 
of this human dignity precept.  Here it suffices to observe that, whatever the 
majority’s invocation of it is taken to mean substantively, human dignity is a 
prerequisite for weighing the traditional purposes of punishment.  This fact, 
together with the fact that a substantive conception of human dignity resonates 
with broad and diverse traditions of moral reasoning—it echoes, that is, integrative 
jurisprudence
155—implies that, per Kennedy, not only judges but perhaps also 
legislators, in forming the criminal law, must take seriously the extent to which 
their moral enterprise reflects not simply on offenders’ moral dessert, but more 
broadly on how their punishment reflects on the law and on us as a society.  This 
view echoes that component of contemporary Catholic teaching expressing 
concern for the death penalty’s capacity to “diminish[] us all.”156  It also echoes the 
moral reflections of those asserting that the ultimate punishment ultimately reflects 
as much on society as on the repugnance of those to whom it is meted out.
157
   
                                                     
154
 Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 420 (emphasis added) (citing Trop, 356 U.S. at 100 (plurality 
opinion); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 999 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment)).  The opinion extensively discusses the purposes of 
punishment in the latter part of its analysis, id. at 441-47. 
155
 See, e.g., THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE (David 
Kretzmer & Eckart Klein eds., 2002); Matthias Mahlmann, The Basic Law at 60: Human 
Dignity and the Culture of Republicanism, 11 GERMAN L.J. 9, 10 (2010) (asserting that 
“one should not overlook that human dignity has become quite generally a leading 
principle of the international human rights culture,” and citing a number of examples across 
international law and institutions).  
156
 See note 43, supra.  
157
 See notes 34-38, supra, and accompanying text. 
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What Kennedy leaves unclear is how that analysis gets carried out, by 
whom, and at what stage of judicial review.  Along such lines, Professor John 
Stinneford critiques the Court’s proportionality jurisprudence as “incoherent,” as 
rooted in “an ever-shifting definition of excessiveness” and an “evolving standards 
of decency test [that] has proven itself an unreliable and ineffective measure of 
cruelty.”
158
  Arguing that the Court’s approach is untethered to objective 
standards, he advocates, for such standard, “the size of the gap between prior 
punishment practice and the new punishment being challenged.”
159
  Even this test, 
however, he subjects to the proviso that a punishment significantly exceeding prior 
practice be justified on a retributive basis.
160
  In the end, then, such a resolution 
merely returns the analysis to a moral core, the standard for which remains one of 
necessarily moral judgment.
161
 
From its restatement of the evolving standards of decency principle, 
Kennedy’s doctrinal summary next casts a related principle, that of narrowing, also 
in moral terms.  Having asserted that evolving standards of decency, read in terms 
of human dignity, require substantive limits on punishment, Kennedy continues: 
For these reasons we have explained that capital 
punishment must be limited to those offenders who 
commit a narrow category of the most serious crimes 
and whose extreme culpability makes them the most 
deserving of execution.  Though the death penalty is 
not invariably unconstitutional, the Court insists upon 
confining the instances in which the punishment can 
be imposed.
162
 
                                                     
158
 Stinneford, supra  note 17, at 899, 968.   
159
 Id. at 972.   
160
 Id. at 968. 
161
 Professor Stinneford concedes that the test for cruelty does “involve[] an exercise 
of the Court’s own judgment,” arguing rather that this Court’s exercise lacks 
“constitutional guideposts.”  See id. at 972.  He seems to assume that the gap-measuring 
standard that he proposes will narrow the range of cases ultimately turning on a normative 
exercise, such that it will be in just a handful of cases that “[t]he Court should also ask 
whether some change in circumstances relevant to the offender’s culpability justifies an 
increase in the harshness of punishment beyond what prior practice permitted.”  Id.  While 
his proposed reform may narrow the scope of the problem that he identifies, it does not 
necessarily resolve the moral reasoning framework quandary—i.e., concerning sources and 
authority—that remains at the core of post-Kennedy proportionality analysis.  
162
 Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 420 (quotations omitted; emphasis added) (citing Simmons, 
543 U.S. at 568; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153). 
Professor Steven F. Shatz cogently describes how the Court’s narrowing principle in 
fact encompasses two distinct but complementary requirements: (1) a “‘genuine narrowing’ 
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Kennedy thus characterizes proportionality generally and narrowing specifically—
linchpins of death penalty jurisprudence—as moral exercises turning (1) on 
culpability and dessert, and (2) on an insistence on confining the death penalty’s 
scope.
163
  The first necessarily pertains to an offender, while the second requires an 
exercise of authority premised on applying broad concepts—e.g., human dignity—
rather than assessing particular cases.  Both exercises, particularly the latter, 
implicate meta-juridical principles—i.e., broad normative or perspectival values 
that orient positive law.
164
  Here, too, the Court as much implicates its own moral 
agency as exhibits concern for the moral implications of statutory frameworks 
entrusting factfinders with authority to assess offenders’ moral dessert.  What still 
remains unclear is how to referee the interplay between social practices’ moral 
implications, and those practices’ arbiters’ own moral agency. 
3. Moral reasoning and Eighth Amendment application 
The force of Kennedy’s moral reasoning lens, and the majority’s and 
dissent’s disagreement over how to focus it, particularly emerges in the application 
                                                                                                                                      
principle” under Furman and Zant, by which states must use specific, statutory criteria to 
restrict the class of death-eligible offenders to those who have, per the state’s view, 
committed the most aggravated murders; (2) a “‘proportionality’ principle” under Enmund 
and Tison, by which states cannot apply the death penalty to a particular crime not deemed 
sufficiently aggravated by a national standard.  “In combination, the principles require 
states to limit death-eligibility to defendants who commit a narrow category of the most 
serious crimes, the worst of the worst . . . .”  Shatz, The Eighth Amendment, the Death 
Penalty, and Ordinary Robbery-Burglary Murderers: A California Case Study, 59 FLA. L. 
REV. 719, 722-23 (2007) (quotations and citations omitted). 
163
 See Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 420-21 (tracing a thirty-plus-year history of decisions 
categorically proscribing the death penalty: for crimes carrying a mandatory death sentence 
(Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 (plurality opinion); Roberts, 428 U.S. at 336 (plurality 
opinion)); for the rape, or kidnapping and rape, of an adult woman (Coker, 433 U.S. at 584; 
Eberheart v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 917 (1977)); for accomplice liability in felony-murder 
simpliciter (Enmund, 458 U.S. at 782 (but see Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987) 
(upholding the death penalty for accomplices in limited circumstances))); for persons with 
mental retardation (Atkins, 536 U.S. at 304); and for juvenile offenders (Simmons, 543 U.S. 
at 571)). 
164
 See, e.g., Jaye Ellis, Review Essay, Overexploitation of a Valuable Resource?  New 
Literature on the Precautionary Principle, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 445, 458 (2006) (“a meta-
juridical principle … provides a conduit between legal and non-legal forms of normativity” 
(citation omitted)).  Of course, a major dilemma in law is whether positivist formulations 
should rely on meta-juridical themes.  See, e.g., Jost Delbrück, Exercising Public Authority 
Beyond the State: Transnational Democracy and/or Alternative Legitimation Strategies, 10 
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 29, 29 & n.3 (2003) (surveying legal positivism’s rejection of 
meta-juridical theories). 
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of the doctrine just summarized.  Three major dimensions flesh out this argument: 
(a) Kennedy’s blurring of the objective indicia and independent judgment analyses; 
(b) its elevation of human dignity as a moral reasoning value; and (c) its reprise of 
the purposes of punishment. 
a) Moralizing the objective indicia analysis 
The majority opinion sets forth a lengthy objective indicia analysis,
165
 
reviewing “the history of the death penalty for [child rape] and other nonhomicide 
crimes, current state statutes and new enactments, and the number of executions 
since 1964”—all to conclude that “there is a national consensus against capital 
punishment for the crime of child rape.”166  But the most important kernel of its 
decision may lie in the fact that, at bottom, the decision turns on the majority’s 
own moral agency.
167
  Its objective indicia analysis has its own limitations,
168
 plus 
there are those asserted by the dissent
169
 and by critical scholarship.
170
  But beyond 
                                                     
165
 See Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 422-34.  
166
 Id. at 434.  
167
 Compare id. at 434 (observing that, while “objective evidence of contemporary 
values as it relates to punishment for child rape is entitled to great weight, but it does not 
end [the Court’s] inquiry”), with id. at (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The Court is willing to block 
the potential emergence of a national consensus in favor of permitting the death penalty for 
child rape because, in the end, what matters is the Court’s ‘own judgment’ regarding ‘the 
acceptability of the death penalty.’” (quoting the majority opinion)).  
168
 Following its decision in June 2008, the Court addressed the fact that its objective 
indicia analysis did not account for the fact, brought to its attention in a petition for 
rehearing, that the U.S. military had a statute permitting the death penalty for child rape.  
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 1 (mem. op. Oct. 1, 2008) (observing, in a statement 
respecting the denial of rehearing, that while the Court had not addressed the military 
statute, that fact was insufficient for rehearing). 
169
 In dissent, Justice Alito argued, inter alia: that the majority failed to establish a 
national consensus against the death penalty for child rape, and/or, that it insufficiently 
acknowledged factors other than evolving standards of decency—e.g., interpretations of the 
reach of the Court’s holding in Coker, barring capital punishment for the rape of an adult 
woman—to explain why more states did not have capital child rape statutes; that it was 
logically faulty to characterize a would-be decision to uphold extant capital child rape 
statutes as an “extension” of the death penalty; and that the Court’s own precedents did not 
require reading the Eighth Amendment as a unidirectional “ratchet” that interprets a 
perhaps temporary leniency consensus as the basis for imposing a constitutional rule.  See 
Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 448-65 (Alito, J., dissenting).  On this last point, the dissent identified 
as a central fault the majority’s resort to its own judgment in such a way as to leave the 
evolving standards of decency principle essentially unprincipled: “In terms of the Court’s 
metaphor of moral evolution, [legislative] enactments might have turned out to be an 
evolutionary dead end.  But they might also have been the beginning of a strong new 
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that, the Court itself does little to clarify the relationship between the objective 
indicia and independent judgment analyses, essentially moralizing the former. 
After surveying national trends of capital punishment for child rape and 
comparing that assessment with the Court’s earlier treatment of the death penalty 
for juveniles, vicarious felony murderers, and defendants with mental 
retardation,
171
 the Court takes up a lengthy analysis of Coker, which precluded 
capital punishment for adult rape and, in doing so, reflected on differences between 
rape and murder.
172
  Acknowledging that Coker, which yielded a plurality opinion, 
left questions about this distinction’s reach “susceptible” of debate,173 Kennedy 
characterized Coker’s reading of national consensus as being “confirmed [by]” 
its—i.e., Coker’s—own “independent judgment” that, while “‘[r]ape is without 
doubt deserving of serious punishment[,] … in terms of moral depravity and of the 
injury to the person and to the public, it does not compare with murder.’”174  It thus 
arguably identified a basis in precedent for trumping, via its own moral judgment, 
any remaining ambiguities that might emerge from—or, per the dissent, be read 
into—the objective indicia analysis.175  This further supports the inference that the 
Court views the ultimate analysis as a normative one.
176
   
                                                                                                                                      
evolutionary line.  We will never know, because the Court today snuffs out the line in its 
incipient stage.”  Id. at 461 (Alito, J., dissenting).  Justice Thomas’s dissent in Graham 
offers a parallel critique.  See note 22, supra, and accompanying text. 
170
 Professor Stinneford, for example, has argued that the Kennedy majority “c[a]me up 
with a fictionalized consensus against the punishment to support its own judgment,” and 
that this critical failure matches the “implausib[ility]” of the Court’s societal consensus 
findings, as well, in Simmons before it and in Graham after it.  Stinneford, supra note 17, at 
922, 973. 
171
 Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 425-26 (citing cases). 
172
 Id. at 426-31 (discussing Coker, 433 U.S. at 592-600 (plurality opinion)). 
173
 Id. at 428. 
174
 Id. at 427-28 (emphasis added) (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 593 (plurality 
opinion)); see also Coker, 433 U.S. at 597 (plurality opinion) (observing that “evidenc[e 
of] the attitude of state legislatures and sentencing juries do not wholly determine th[e] 
controversy[ before the Court], for the Constitution contemplates that in the end our own 
judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty 
under the Eighth Amendment.”). 
175
 Objecting to the majority’s analysis of Coker, Justice Alito argued that “dicta in 
th[e] Court’s decision in Coker … stunted legislative consideration of the question whether 
the death penalty for the targeted offense of raping a young child is consistent with the 
prevailing standards of decency,” further observing, as relevant to assessing evidence of the 
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But the Court’s conceptual move underscores rather than resolves the 
fundamental question about moral authority, its sources, and their alignment within 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.  By invoking Coker’s “confirmation” language, 
one reasonably could ask whether the objective indicia analysis is meant to involve 
simple jurisdiction counting, which the Court ballpark-measures (i.e., “confirms”) 
via the yardstick of its own judgment.  Or, could it mean examining with greater 
scrutiny on what moral reasoning basis there might be movement in one direction 
or another?  The dissent alludes to the potential moral salience—not to mention 
potentially dispositive value—of such movements,177 but does not further clarify 
how, when, or even whether they should figure into the calculus of the Court’s 
own judgment.  It is one thing to critique the weight that the majority gives to its 
own judgment and its reasoning.
178
  But short of mustering a majority to overturn 
the two-prong analysis altogether, the dissent’s critique throws stones at a glass 
house rather than offer a coherent alternative for assessing the relevance of 
objective indices’ own moral salience to independent judgment analysis. 
                                                                                                                                      
evolving standards of decency, that “conscientious state lawmakers, whatever their 
personal views about the morality of imposing the death penalty for child rape, may defer 
to this Court’s dicta, either because they respect our authority and expertise in interpreting 
the Constitution or merely because they do not relish the prospect of being held to have 
violated the Constitution and contravened prevailing ‘standards of decency.’”  Kennedy, 
554 U.S. at 448, 452 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
176
 This is confirmed—by way of objection—by the dissent, which argues that while 
six new state laws [targeting child rape might not] necessarily establish a 
“national consensus” or even … [serve as] sure evidence of an 
ineluctable trend[, i]n terms of the Court’s metaphor of moral evolution, 
these enactments might have turned out to be an evolutionary dead end[ 
or] … the beginning of a strong new evolutionary line.  We will never 
know, because the Court today snuffs out the line in its incipient stage. 
Id. at 461 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
177
 See note 169. 
178
 See note 169; see also Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 462 (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
“[t]he Eighth Amendment protects the right of an accused.  It does not authorize this Court 
to strike down federal or state criminal laws on the ground that they are not in the best 
interests of crime victims or the broader society.  The Court’s policy arguments concern 
matters that legislators should—and presumably do—take into account in deciding whether 
to enact a capital child-rape statute, but these arguments are irrelevant to the question that 
is before us in this case.  Our cases have cautioned against using the aegis of the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clause to cut off the normal democratic processes, but the Court 
forgets that warning here.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted; citing Atkins, 
536 U.S. at 323 (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 176, (joint opinion of 
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)). 
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For example, should courts somehow determine whether pro-death penalty 
movement is a function of temporary “moral panic”—i.e., moral intuitionism 
alone—rather than of a deliberative social judgment, expressed through legislation, 
that a particular crime implicates such profound culpability and has such insidious 
effects as to merit the ultimate punishment?
179
  Perhaps a finding of the former 
would justify placing a thumb on the independent judgment scale, while a finding 
of the latter should preclude it.  Were the Court to clarify that a jurisprudence that 
necessarily embodies moral judgment requires a kind of scrutiny (e.g., akin to 
rational basis—or even strict—scrutiny, but specified as moral reasoning), it might 
develop a test worthy of integrative jurisprudence, and more likely to yield greater 
than five-to-four majorities.  But, were such a test to be developed, what 
substantive norm might guide it?  Could human dignity qualify? 
b) Human dignity as a moral reasoning value 
Introducing its independent judgment analysis by invoking precedent,
180
 
Kennedy proceeds to explore moral dimensions of the victim’s dignity: 
It must be acknowledged that there are moral grounds 
to question a rule barring capital punishment for a 
crime against an individual that did not result in death.  
These facts illustrate the point.  Here the victim’s fright, 
the sense of betrayal, and the nature of her injuries 
caused more prolonged physical and mental suffering 
than, say, a sudden killing by an unseen assassin.  The 
attack was not just on her but on her childhood.  For 
this reason, we should be most reluctant to rely upon 
the language of the plurality in Coker, which posited 
that, for the victim of rape, “life may not be nearly so 
happy as it was,” but it is not beyond repair.  Rape has a 
permanent psychological, emotional, and sometimes 
physical impact on the child.  We cannot dismiss the 
                                                     
179
 As Professor John Stinneford has argued,  
[t]he Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause … does not focus on 
punishments that are “cruel and rare” but on those that are “cruel and 
new.”  This focus on new punishments implies that the core purpose of 
the Clause is to protect criminal offenders when the government’s desire 
to inflict pain has become temporarily and unjustly enflamed, whether 
this desire is caused by political or racial animus or moral panic in the 
face of a perceived crisis.  In these situations, the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause is supposed to serve as a check on the impulse to 
ratchet up punishments to an unprecedented degree of harshness. 
Stinneford, supra note 17, at 907. 
180
 Id. at 434 (citing Coker, 433 U.S. at 597 (plurality opinion), as well as Simmons, 
543 U.S. at 563, and Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797). 
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years of long anguish that must be endured by the 
victim of child rape.
181
 
Here the majority affirms the moral valence of insights that stem from the task of 
assessing criminal acts—a task that, per the dissent, must remain within the ambit 
of democratic rather than judicial process.
182
   
Either approach, though, appropriately characterizes the death penalty as a 
form of moral expression, acknowledging that the impetus to inflict it stems from 
some sense of redressing a grossly damaged moral order.  Consistent, moreover, 
with the thesis that Kennedy portrays dynamic moral reasoning, the majority 
follows this statement affirming moral intuitions (i.e., broad, and legitimate, 
emotions and sensibilities about the repugnance of child rape and the long-term 
harm it causes), with a reaffirmation that the moral reasoning framework of the 
Court’s jurisprudence (i.e., the rule of law), must guide the justices’ own moral 
reflection.  For the Court emphatically declares that “[i]t does not follow”—i.e., 
presumably, from moral intuitions alone, no matter how powerful—“that capital 
punishment is a proportionate penalty for [child rape].”183  Rather, 
[t]he constitutional prohibition against excessive or 
cruel and unusual punishments mandates that the 
State’s power to punish “be exercised within the limits 
of civilized standards.”  Evolving standards of decency 
that mark the progress of a maturing society counsel us 
to be most hesitant before interpreting the Eighth 
Amendment to allow the extension of the death penalty, 
a hesitation that has special force where no life was 
taken in the commission of the crime.  It is an 
established principle that decency, in its essence, 
presumes respect for the individual and thus moderation 
or restraint in the application of capital punishment.
184
 
Here some foundational sense of the offender’s human dignity is presented 
almost as an a priori break on permitting capital punishment, irrespective of the 
moral repugnance of the crime or of society’s desire to validate or recover the 
dignity of one who has grievously suffered it.  And yet, again, we return to a 
question of authority and standards: what kind of standard—whether 
constitutional, or moral/ethical—guides the human dignity analysis, whether in this 
                                                     
181
 Id. at 435 (internal citations omitted). 
182
 See note 169. 
183
 Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 435 (emphasis added). 
184
 Id. (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 99, 100 (plurality opinion)) (internal citations 
omitted). 
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case or others?  Here Kennedy is woefully opaque.  To be sure, deciding a case, at 
least in part, on premises concerning human dignity was not novel to Kennedy.  
Towards the conclusion of his opinion for the majority in Simmons (an important 
Kennedy precursor), Justice Kennedy described the Constitution as “set[ting] forth, 
and rest[ing] upon, . . . broad provisions to secure individual freedom and preserve 
human dignity.” 185   Moreover, as Kennedy develops its independent judgment 
analysis, it returns to the evolving standards of decency (which might be viewed as 
a proxy of sorts for dignity), pointing to values enshrined in the Court’s 
jurisprudence that embrace consistency and predictability in the execution of 
capital judgments, and the due consideration of individual offenders’ character and 
the circumstances of their offense.
186
   
But Kennedy does not say how these considerations, typically associated 
with the moral analysis entrusted to sentencing bodies per the Woodson-Lockett 
line of cases, flesh out some conception of human dignity relevant to independent 
judgment analysis.
187
  Perhaps the Court wants to balance punishment’s expressive 
                                                     
185
 Simmons, 543 U.S. at 578.  See also, e.g., Maxine D. Goodman, Human Dignity in 
Supreme Court Constitutional Jurisprudence, 84 NEB. L. REV. 740 (2006).  With particular 
attention to Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overturning state laws criminalizing 
adult, same-sex, consensual sodomy), which included multiple references to human 
dignity—and also was a Justice Kennedy opinion—Professor Goodman has studied the 
Court’s deployment of human dignity as a substantive constitutional principle, which she 
defines as “a moral status affording individuals rights and standing against state action that 
demeans, offends, or humiliates.”  Id. at 789.  She also notes, however, that its decisions 
have not provided a clear “means of consistently applying human dignity as an underlying 
value.”  Id. at 744.  Notably, Professor Sheldon Lyke has argued that Lawrence “was 
decided in the shadow of the Eighth Amendment[, with] … changes in the Justices’ views 
toward crime, punishment, and decency … of great significance to the majority opinion.”  
Sheldon Bernard Lyke, Lawrence as an Eighth Amendment Case: Sodomy and the 
Evolving Standards of Decency, 15 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 633, 644 (2009). 
186
 Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 435-36 (citing California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 541 (1987) 
(death penalty statutes must avoid arbitrariness and unpredictability); Godfrey v. Georgia, 
446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (plurality opinion) (states must narrowly and precisely define 
aggravating factors used to determine if death is warranted); Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604-05 
(plurality opinion) (factfinders must assess character and record of individual offender and 
circumstances of offense); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (plurality opinion) (same). 
187
 See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303-04 (plurality opinion) (describing as “[a] … 
constitutional shortcoming,” a “statute[’s] … failure to allow the particularized 
consideration of relevant aspects of the character and record of each convicted defendant 
before the imposition upon him of a sentence of death. . . . A process that accords no 
significance to relevant facets of the character and record of the individual offender or the 
circumstances of the particular offense excludes from consideration in fixing the ultimate 
punishment of death the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from 
the diverse frailties of humankind.  It treats all persons convicted of a designated offense 
42 JURISPRUDENCE THAT NECESSARILY EMBODIES MORAL JUDGMENT:  
© 2012 Kurt M. Denk 
Draft accepted for publication, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. --- (forthcoming 2012/2013) 
 
justice vis-à-vis a crime victim’s human dignity, on one hand, and an offender’s 
human dignity, on the other.  For example, does elevating a human dignity precept 
mean that (1) absent a moral reasoning calculus that (a) considers an offender’s 
dignity as presumptive fact and then (b) assesses its relevance to the 
proportionality of punishment decreed for the crime, then (2) otherwise-legitimate 
moral intuitions about an offender’s dessert of said punishment (e.g., as the dissent 
alludes
188
) are constitutionally deficient?  If so, it does not say so.  Rather, the 
majority blandly acknowledges that enshrining such values into applicable rules of 
law yields “tension between general rules and case-specific circumstances [that] 
ha[ve] produced results not altogether satisfactory.”189  It then further dodges the 
issue by adverting to, without engaging, some justices’ call to “cease efforts to 
resolve the tension and simply allow legislatures, prosecutors, courts, and juries 
greater latitude.”190  For a jurisprudence that necessarily embodies moral judgment, 
neither the Kennedy majority’s conceptual framing of the basis for applying its 
independent judgment, nor dissenting justices’ apparent preference for wholesale 
majoritarian deference, which merely begs the perennial question concerning the 
basis for and proper scope of judicial review, provide clear direction. 
In a sense, here we observe the justices struggling—as most thoughtful 
persons presumably do—with their own moral agency, and with identifying which 
sources are appropriate and/or relevant to implementing it.  Perhaps only history, 
only the slow development of jurisprudence itself—a theme addressed in Part IV—
can begin to resolve lacunae such as these.  Or maybe imprecision itself, judicial 
and moral, together with historical experience, point the way.  It seems to have for 
Justice Stevens in Baze, and other justices in earlier cases, who concluded that “the 
failure to limit these same imprecisions by stricter enforcement of narrowing rules 
has raised doubts concerning the constitutionality of capital punishment itself.”191   
                                                                                                                                      
not as uniquely individual human beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated 
mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of death.” (emphasis added)). 
188
 See Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 447 (Alito, J., dissenting) (alluding to the relevance to 
punishment of, e.g., particularly sadistic crimes or an offender’s heinous criminal record). 
189
 Id. (citing cases). 
190
 Id. at 436-37 (citing, e.g., Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 667-73 (1990) (Scalia, 
J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (arguing that the Woodson-Lockett rule 
requiring consideration of case- and offender-specific circumstances should be abandoned). 
191
 Id. at 437 (citing, Baze, 553 U.S. at 82-86 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).  In 
Baze, Justice Stevens quoted Furman, 408 U.S. at 312 (White, J., concurring), for the 
proposition “that the imposition of the death penalty represents the pointless and needless 
extinction of life with only marginal contributions to any discernible social or public 
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In any event, the result of Kennedy’s moral reasoning analysis is a kind of 
emperor-has-no-clothes peek at the justices as dynamic moral agents who remain 
“in search of a unifying principle”192 to ensure that their moral reasoning remains 
judicial moral reasoning, rather than moral reasoning—much less, moral 
intuitionism—by people who happen to be justices.  Premised on an analogized 
“moral distinction between a murderer and a robber,”193 Kennedy used the case of 
an eight-year-old’s brutal rape at the hands of her stepfather to set forth a bright-
line rule distinguishing murder from all crimes against individuals that do not lead 
to a victim’s death.194  Although this move may offer a unifying principle simply 
by virtue of presenting a clear rule—and thus represents an appropriate exercise of 
the Court’s judicial authority—both the vehemence of the dissent, not to mention 
critical commentary on the decision after the fact,
195
 made it clear that invoking 
human dignity did not necessarily buttress the majority’s moral authority.  Are 
there, then, any utilitarian or other reasoned grounds for the Court’s approach? 
                                                                                                                                      
purposes.  A penalty with such negligible returns to the State is patently excessive and 
cruel and unusual punishment violative of the Eighth Amendment.”  Baze, 553 U.S. at 86 
(Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (quotation and brackets omitted).  Kennedy, 554 U.S. 
at 437, also cites Furman, 408 U.S. at 310-14 (White, J., concurring), and Callins v. 
Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1144-1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari), as in line with Justice Stevens’s view in Baze. 
192
 Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 437.  See also id. at 440-41 (observing that the Court “ha[s] 
spent more than 32 years articulating limiting factors that channel the jury’s discretion to 
avoid the death penalty’s arbitrary imposition in the case of capital murder.  Though that 
practice remains sound, beginning the same process for crimes for which no one has been 
executed in more than 40 years would require experimentation in an area where a failed 
experiment would result in the execution of individuals undeserving of the death penalty.  
Evolving standards of decency are difficult to reconcile with a regime that seeks to expand 
the death penalty to an area where standards to confine its use are indefinite and obscure.”). 
193
 Id. at 438 (internal quotation marks omitted; citing Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797). 
194
 See id. at 438 (“Consistent with evolving standards of decency and the teachings of 
our precedents we conclude that, in determining whether the death penalty is excessive, 
there is a distinction between intentional first-degree murder on the one hand and 
nonhomicide crimes against individual persons, even including child rape, on the other.  
The latter crimes may be devastating in their harm, as here, but in terms of moral depravity 
and of the injury to the person and to the public, they cannot be compared to murder in 
their “severity and irrevocability.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
195
 Both candidates for president at the time, then-Senator Barack Obama and Senator 
John McCain, criticized Kennedy.  Linda Greenhouse, Justices Bar Death Penalty For the 
Rape of a Child, N.Y. Times, June 26, 2008, available at 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=950DE2D81239F935A15755C0A96E9C8
B63&scp=2&sq=Obama+McCain+Kennedy+v.+Louisiana&st=nyt (last visited Jan. 22, 
2012). 
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c) Reprise of punishment’s purposes 
Following from its rule distinguishing between homicide and nonhomicide 
crimes, Kennedy observes that its “decision is consistent with the justifications 
offered for the death penalty,” which is “excessive” when “grossly out of 
proportion to the crime or … [when it fails to] fulfill the two distinct social 
purposes served by the death penalty: retribution and deterrence of capital 
crimes.”196  After briefly conceding—but with little elaboration on the significance 
of the fact—that “it cannot be said with any certainty that the death penalty for 
child rape serves no deterrent or retributive function,”197  the majority offers a 
lengthy assessment of retribution.  From the first premise that retribution “reflects 
society’s and the victim’s interests in seeing that the offender is repaid for the hurt 
he caused,” it concludes that retribution “does not justify the harshness of the death 
penalty” for child rape, reaffirming its insisted distinction between homicide and 
nonhomicide crimes, not to mention its moral reasoning premises.
198
   
Returning to an earlier theme, Kennedy observes that retribution extends 
from the one being punished to his punishers; it reflects on society, in the sense of 
implicating the fundamental moral question of “whether capital punishment ‘has 
the potential ... to allow the community as a whole, including the surviving family 
and friends of the victim, to affirm its own judgment that the culpability of the 
prisoner is so serious that the ultimate penalty must be sought and imposed.’”199  
Of course, this merely begs a moral question, and in so setting up that question—
i.e., “when does a non-killing justify a killing”—Kennedy implicitly invokes the 
lex talionis.  Regrettably, though, it says no more about what that invocation 
means, or should mean, vis-à-vis the purposes of punishment as understood or as 
expressed in contemporary mores.  For a jurisprudence that necessarily embodies 
moral judgment, this is too large a question to simply leave on the table. 
                                                     
196
 Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 441 (emphasis added) (citing Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 
(plurality opinion); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173, 183, 187 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and 
Stevens, JJ.)).  This is a somewhat curious framing of Eighth Amendment analysis—i.e., 
vis-à-vis its juxtaposition of and proportionality and the various theories of punishment, as 
Professor Stinneford has argued, supra note 17, at 904-905, 908, 914-17, 961-78. 
197
 See Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 441. 
198
 Id. at 442 (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319; Coker, 433 U.S. at 597-98 (plurality 
opinion); Furman, 408 U.S. at 308 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
199
 Id. at 442 (emphasis added) (quoting Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 958 
(2007)). 
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Unsurprisingly, the dissent echoes the majority’s affirmation of society’s 
interest in expressing moral outrage at the crime of child rape, but rejects its 
subsequent conclusion that “[i]t is not at all evident that the child rape victim’s hurt 
is lessened when the law permits the death of the perpetrator.”200  Setting aside a 
lacuna in the dissent’s reasoning—i.e., how that would or would not be evident, 
not to mention how such evidence would be susceptible of an administrable rule—
it is notable that the majority argues that “[s]ociety’s desire to inflict the death 
penalty for child rape by enlisting the child victim to assist it over the course of 
years in asking for capital punishment” itself “forces a moral choice on the child, 
who is not of mature age to make that choice.”201  Presumably it sees such a 
prospect’s moral murkiness as grounds for a categorical rule.  But does that view 
flow from moral reasoning, or does it merely express judicial moral fiat?  As the 
dissent trenchantly observes, the majority is content for judicial moral reasoning to 
remain in search of a unifying principle, but is less content to allow the same for 
other moral actors—i.e., legislators, and the public whom they represent.202 
The majority is not unaware of this criticism.  In a coda to its expansive 
reasoning, the majority acknowledges that whether the Court has overstepped its 
authority is a legitimate question.  That is, will its “institutional position and its 
holding … have the effect of blocking further or later consensus in favor of the 
[death] penalty[?]”203  Has it impermissibly cast the evolving standards of decency 
as “a one-way ratchet[?]”204  Has the Court “ma[d]e it more difficult for consensus 
to change or emerge[, by] … itself becom[ing] enmeshed in the process, part judge 
                                                     
200
 Id. at 442.  Cf. id. at 461-62 (Alito, J., dissenting) (critiquing the majority for being 
“willing to block the potential emergence of a national consensus in favor of permitting the 
death penalty for child rape,” for “strik[ing] down federal or state criminal laws on the 
ground that they are not in the best interests of crime victims or the broader society,” and 
for ignoring the precedents’ “caution[] against using the aegis of the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause to cut off the normal democratic processes.” (quotations omitted)). 
201
 Id. at 443 (emphasis added). 
202
 Id. at 461-62 (Alito, J., dissenting) (developing this critique). 
203
 Id. at 446. 
204
 Id. at 469 (Alito, J., dissenting); see also id. at 466 (Alito, J., dissenting) (observing 
that “th[e] Court has previously made it clear that ‘[t]he Eighth Amendment is not a 
ratchet, whereby a temporary consensus on leniency for a particular crime fixes a 
permanent constitutional maximum, disabling the States from giving effect to altered 
beliefs and responding to changed social conditions.’” (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 
U.S. 957, 990 (1991) (principal opinion)). 
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and part the maker of that which it judges[?]”205  In the end, Kennedy elides the 
dissent’s criticism—and its resounding “yes!” to these questions.  In doing so, 
however, it does provide a basis for ongoing death penalty discourse. 
First, the majority neither confirms nor denies that it is setting forth a one-
way ratchet.  It concludes somewhat cryptically: “Difficulties in administering the 
[death] penalty to ensure against its arbitrary and capricious application require 
adherence to a rule reserving its use, at this stage of evolving standards and in 
cases of crimes against individuals, for crimes that take the life of the victim.”206  
Does this leave the door open for a state to re-enact a capital child rape statute, 
after extensively documenting shifts in national consensus favoring such a law, on 
the assumption that, once imposed and challenged, a majority might be persuaded 
that, at that new “stage of evolving standards,” a carefully morally reasoned and 
sufficiently tailored statute might be upheld notwithstanding Kennedy?   Probably 
not, given the clear statements elsewhere in the opinion distinguishing between 
homicide and nonhomicide crimes.  But it is interesting to ask whether the 
majority meant to end on an open-ended note, or simply ran out of gas. 
Second, the majority does rather magisterially set forth the “principle that 
use of the death penalty be restrained,” in keeping with “[t]he rule of evolving 
standards of decency with specific marks on the way to full progress and mature 
judgment . . . .”  Part of such progress and maturity, it would seem, consists of a 
sense of “justice [that] … preserv[es] the possibility that [a perpetrator] and the 
system will find ways to allow him to understand the enormity of his offense.”  
Arguably, then, the Kennedy majority holds out, even if it does not further 
explicate, hope in the merits of rehabilitation as one of criminal punishment’s 
purposes.
207
  In casting rehabilitation as a project of both the offender and “the 
system” (presumably the proxy for society), Kennedy implicates the relationship 
between justice and mercy.
208
  Inasmuch as mercy issues from an authority’s own 
                                                     
205
 Id. at 446. 
206
 Id. at 447 (emphasis added). 
207
 See id. at 420 (identifying rehabilitation as “one … of [punishment’s] three 
principal rationales”) (citing Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 999 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in judgment)). 
208
 In a lecture given on the occasion of her assumption of the Henry J. Friendly Chair 
at Harvard Law School, Professor Carol Steiker provocatively explored the relationship 
between justice and mercy in the Jewish and Christian theological traditions and in U.S. 
criminal jurisprudence, arguing that a more candid and robust assertion of the role of mercy 
as a proper exercise of judicial discretion will advance, rather than vitiate, the aims of 
justice proper to the rule of law—i.e., giving each her or his due.  Carol S. Steiker, The 
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moral reasoning and exercise of discretion,
209
 Kennedy’s coda reprises the theme 
that the morality of criminal punishment—especially capital punishment—has as 
much to do with those who impose it as with those on whom it is imposed.  In this 
way, Kennedy appears to evince a sort of faith in society’s moral capacity to 
grapple with the gravest depths and effects of child rape—perhaps, even, a 
perpetrator’s capacity to atone for it.  But these remarks are dicta.  In so closing, 
Kennedy may not have clarified how this jurisprudence that necessarily embodies 
moral judgment should proceed.  But it does offer a moral vision of sorts, setting 
forth inchoate dimensions of an integrative jurisprudence.  Doing so invites critical 
comparison with other voices that attempt to do the same.  It invites, that is, death 
penalty discourse.  Catholic death penalty teaching can be one such relevant voice. 
 
III.   CATHOLIC DEATH PENALTY TEACHING 
As used here, Catholic teaching refers to the “substantial body of literature 
on social questions” propagated by the Roman Catholic Church. 210   Formally 
speaking, this teaching is published under the aegis of church officials or official 
ecclesiastical bodies.  Documents comprising it, though, are “the accepted 
expression of a [broader] social outlook that the Catholic tradition generates.”211  
Thus, while official “Catholic teaching refers … to the texts issued by those who 
hold an official teaching position within the Church,” its “influence comes from 
how the texts have been ‘translated’ into sermons, lectures, public programs, social 
                                                                                                                                      
Mercy Seat: Discretion, Justice, and Mercy in the American Criminal Justice System, 
address at Harvard Law School, Nov. 9, 2011 (copy provided by Professor Steiker on file; 
to be published in THE POLITICAL HEART OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: ESSAYS ON THEMES 
OF WILLIAM J. STUNTZ (Michael Klarman, David Skeel, and Carol S. Steiker, eds., 
forthcoming, 2012)). 
209
 See id. at 4 (ascribing to Professor William J. Stuntz’s work the proposition that 
“American criminal justice in our new millennium is in many ways more arbitrary, 
discriminatory, and unbalanced in terms of power than before the advent of … discretion-
cabining developments” in criminal procedure), 9 (arguing for a “‘prudential’ theory of 
mercy,” on the premise that there is “a place for the exercise of mercy in institutions of 
criminal justice regardless of which normative theory or theories of punishment th[at] 
criminal justice is thought to promote.” (citation omitted)). 
210
 Himes, supra note 81, at 3.  Examples include, e.g., PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR 
JUSTICE AND PEACE, COMPENDIUM OF THE SOCIAL DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH (2004) 
[hereinafter COMPENDIUM] (explicating key documents and themes of Catholic social 
teaching); USCCB, supra note 43 (setting forth church death penalty teaching in the U.S.). 
211
 Himes, supra note 81, at 3.  
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movements, acts of charity, just deeds, and peacemaking.”212  Accordingly, this 
“historical tradition of Catholic social thought” includes, e.g., medieval 
philosopher-theologian Thomas Aquinas’s Treatise on Law; international law 
pioneer Francisco Suarez’s Laws and God the Lawgiver; English lawyer-saint 
Thomas More’s Utopia, twentieth-century New York social activist Dorothy Day’s 
Catholic Worker editorials; and other literature by “Catholic thinkers who address 
social questions of their time from the perspective of faith.  All of this and more 
[represents] … Catholic social thought,” as related to but distinct from Catholic 
social teaching.
213
  This Article draws upon both but, for more apposite 
comparison with Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, emphasizes the latter.
214
 
A. Historical background 
Professors E. Christian Brugger and James J. Megivern have 
comprehensively treated Catholic/Christian death penalty teaching’s historical and 
theological arc, some aspects of which were introduced in Part I.
215
  Surveying 
                                                     
212
 Id. 
213
 Id. (emphasis added). 
214
 Concerning sources of Catholic social teaching and respective levels of authority, 
see Richard R. Gaillardetz, The Ecclesiological Foundations of Modern Catholic Social 
Teaching, MODERN CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING 72, supra note 81.  In descending order, 
(1) dogma, (2) definitive doctrine, (3) non-definitive but authoritative doctrine, and (4) 
prudential admonitions related to church discipline represent gradations of Church 
teaching’s authoritative status.  Id. at 86-90.  Applying that analysis, Professor Gaillardetz 
has described the Church’s death penalty teaching—specifically, its “restrictive conditions 
that must exist in order to justify capital punishment”—as an example of the third level.  In 
other words, it represents a topic-focused specification of broader, more authoritative, 
universal moral principles—e.g., “the law of love, the dignity of the human person, [and] 
respect for human life.”  Id. at 89.  Accordingly, the teaching is among those having 
“emerge[d] out of the Church’s ecclesial reflection upon universal moral teachings in the 
light of theological inquiry, the insights of the human sciences, and rational reflection on 
human experience.”  Id.  In this way it is authoritative, but non-dogmatic—meaning it is 
not considered to be a part of divine revelation, but rather has been “shaped by changing 
moral contexts and contingent empirical data.”  Id. at 90.  The upshot?  Catholic believers 
would be expected to treat the teaching “as more than mere opinion[] or pious exhortation,” 
and thus “must strive to integrate [it] into their religious outlook,” though “it is possible to 
imagine a Catholic who might be unable to accept [the] … teaching as reflective of God’s 
will for humankind and [thus] could legitimately withhold giving an internal assent to it.”  
Id. 
215
 See generally BRUGGER, supra note 63, at 59-138.  Professor Megivern—whose 
study is not limited to Catholic Christianity—identifies five historical shifts in the Church’s 
approach to the death penalty: (1) the fourth the fifth centuries, when Christianity became 
the Roman Empire’s established religion; (2) the eighth and ninth centuries, when the 
western Church allied itself with secular powers; (3) the eleventh to thirteenth centuries, 
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additional details here facilitates understanding Catholic teaching’s present 
iteration, and the significance of its relatively recent near-abolitionist stance. 
The death penalty in early Christianity was situated within an evolving 
relationship between religious and secular power.  Second- and third-century 
theologians harmonized biblical warrants for the death penalty with endorsements 
of the state’s right to impose it.216  Once Christianity became the official religion of 
the Roman Empire this harmonization gave way, by the fifth century, to a 
“complex intertwining of Christian creed and Roman law definitively mark[ing] 
‘Imperial Christianity,’” and a concomitant “lethal combination of the Bible and 
Roman law.” 217   Thus came the Church’s official endorsement of capital 
punishment for crimes against the state or the faith—first with, but eventually 
without, the proviso that it be imposed by non-Christian authorities.
218
  Prominent 
figures like Saint Augustine (354-430) sought to straddle a fine line, endorsing 
civil authority’s right to inflict the death penalty, while preaching tenets of Gospel 
faith centered on proportional justice, the practice of mercy, and the hope for 
repentance.
219
  Professor Kuttner’s theory of religious-secular interpenetration 
looms large.  So, too, we can observe how themes from Kennedy’s coda, just 
discussed, echo a deep historico-religious tradition. 
The medieval Church’s consolidation of power corresponded with an 
articulation and eventual codification of an explicit pro-death penalty stance, 
limited only by a ban on clergy participation and an insistence that capital 
punishment follow from “proper motivation”—i.e., protection of the common 
good, which again parallels aspects of the preceding analysis of Kennedy.
220
  Legal 
commentary such as Gratian’s Decretum (1139) affirmed secular powers’ right to 
                                                                                                                                      
when the ascent of a centralized, monarchical papacy coincided with the rise of theological 
and canonical reflection on the use of lethal force to combat movements deemed heretical; 
(4) the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries, when the Protestant Reformation rocked the 
Western Church, and small groups of Christians began to oppose the religious use of (or 
imprimatur on) lethal force; and (5) the eighteenth to twentieth centuries, when many 
forces, both secular and religious, championed, and then gradually effected, abolition of the 
death penalty in much of the West.  MEGIVERN, supra note 63, at 3-4. 
216
 BRUGGER, supra note 63, at 75. 
217
 MEGIVERN, supra note 63, at 27-45. 
218
 Id. at 27-45.  See also BRUGGER, supra note 63, at 74, 84-85. 
219
 BRUGGER, supra note 63, at 89-93; MEGIVERN, supra note 63, at 35-45. 
220
 BRUGGER, supra note 63, at 96-112, 112; MEGIVERN, supra note 63, at 53-95. 
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impose death and provided that, while ecclesiastical authorities could not, they 
could summon the faithful to defend the faith by coercive, even fatal, means.
221
  By 
the early thirteenth century, Pope Innocent III required a group of heretics 
reconciling with the Church to accept the Waldensian oath, declaring the non-
imputability of mortal sin to civil authorities administering capital punishment.
222
 
Meanwhile, positivist affirmations of capital punishment found intellectual support 
in Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225-74), whose Summa Theologica affirmed 
exceptions to the Decalogue’s prohibition against killing—capital sentences among 
them—on the premise of authority’s duty to defend the common good.223  By the 
late medieval period, church-state collusion in capital punishment was settled in 
both theory and practice.
224
  Now-notorious extensions of this collusion appeared 
in the post-Reformation and Renaissance Church, when ecclesiastical authorities 
unhesitatingly endorsed the crusades and capital punishment for heresy.
225
 
Thus by the time the Roman Catechism was published in 1566, which 
codified the wide range of doctrine regularized by the Council of Trent (1545-63), 
Catholic death penalty teaching likewise reached codified form: 
Another kind of lawful slaying belongs to the civil 
authorities, to whom is entrusted power of life and 
death, by the legal and judicious exercise of which they 
punish the guilty and protect the innocent.  The just use 
of this power . . . is an act of paramount obedience to 
[the Fifth] Commandment which prohibits murder . . . 
[and has as its end] the preservation and security of 
human life.  Now the punishments inflicted by the civil 
authority, which is the legitimate avenger of crime, 
naturally tend to this end, since they give security to 
life by repressing outrage and violence.
226
 
                                                     
221
 MEGIVERN, supra note 63, at 88-91; BRUGGER, supra note 63, at 100-02.  The 
relevant portions from Gratian’s Decretum are Causa XXIII, Questio V and Questio VIII. 
222
 BRUGGER, supra note 63, at 103-07. 
223
 Id. at 108-111.  See AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA II-II, q. 64. 
224
 Id. at 112. 
225
 BRUGGER, supra note 63, at 119-22, and MEGIVERN, supra note 63, at 107-11, offer 
frank treatments of this history. 
226
 CATECHISM OF THE COUNCIL OF TRENT FOR PARISH PRIESTS Pt. III (John A. 
McHugh & Charles J. Callan, trans. & eds., 1934) (translation provided in MEGIVERN, 
supra note 24, at 168 n.85, 170-71)).  Catholicism was not unique in reconciling religio-
cultural legalism with capital punishment: “[t]he other great Abrahamic religions, Judaism 
and Islam, have not historically sustained a strong pacifist or abolitionist tradition.  Being 
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Interpenetration looms large, presumably explaining, in part, why the summary of 
Catholic death penalty teaching reproduced in Part I(C), sounds as much like a text 
of secular jurisprudence as one specifically ecclesiastical. 
B. Present Catholic teaching 
Contemporary Catholic death penalty teaching has evolved in a manner 
akin to jurisprudence.  Much of this stems from context: the Roman Catholic 
Church encompasses a highly organized structure of beliefs and authority, and law 
occupies a central position.
227
  Given these characteristics and their rootedness in 
the history just surveyed, it is unsurprising that the Church’s own law and its 
commentary on secular law address punishment for intentional homicide.  Thus the 
Code of Canon Law includes penal prescriptions for church members who commit 
homicide,
228
 while the Catechism addresses secular authority’s responsibilities 
concerning criminal punishment for murder, outlining theoretical justifications for 
and both normative and utilitarian arguments against the death penalty.
229
 
Given the history recited above, it is particularly noteworthy that Catholic 
teaching’s longstanding premise that civil authority possesses a right to inflict 
capital punishment has become so conditioned that its present iteration closely 
                                                                                                                                      
religions of the law, they [too] encoded support for capital punishment early on.”  Jean 
Bethke Elshtain, Foreword, in RELIGION AND THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 9, at xi. 
227
 Vatican City’s sovereign status signals the Church’s identity as a legal system.  See 
The Holy See, VATICAN CITY STATE, http://www.vatican.va/vatican_city_state/index.htm 
(last visited Sept. 20, 2011).  Its Code of Canon Law serves as a formal legal system 
governing ecclesiastical order.  CODE OF CANON LAW: LATIN-ENGLISH EDITION (rev. 
trans., Canon Law Society of America, 1998).  Its Catechism comprehensively surveys core 
aspects of Catholic belief and practice in a manner akin to Restatements in various fields of 
the law.  See generally CCC, supra note 85. 
That the Church represents a legal culture is attested to by its role in forming, and in 
being formed by, the broad Western legal tradition, see generally ch. 2, The Origin of the 
Western Legal Tradition in the Papal Revolution, in BERMAN, supra note 59, and by the 
characteristics of order and authority that it retains.  For example, documents of the Second 
Vatican Council (1962-65) have the binding force of law for local Catholic entities 
throughout the world, governing everything from the Church’s religious doctrines and 
vision for its role in society, to the framework for worship practices, institutional offices, 
and the identity, role, and responsibilities of clerics, religious orders, and laity.  VATICAN 
COUNCIL II: VOLUME I, THE CONCILIAR AND POST CONCILIAR DOCUMENTS (Austin 
Flannery, ed., new rev. ed. 1996).  An overview of the Church’s conception of law appears 
in CCC, supra note 85, §§ 1949-1986, which it defines, at § 1951, as “a rule of conduct 
enacted by competent authority for the sake of the common good.” 
228
 CODE OF CANON LAW, supra note 227, canon 1397. 
229
 See CCC, supra note 85 §§ 2265-67. 
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approaches the normative threshold of death penalty abolitionism.  Contemporary 
Catholic death penalty teaching encompasses three, interrelated elements: 
(1) a restrictive presumption that the state may impose capital 
punishment only when necessary to protect human life; 
(2) a corollary affirmative presumption, premised on notions of human 
dignity and the common good, that endorses nonlethal protective 
force; and  
(3) an assumption that contemporary historical realities render rare, “if 
not practically nonexistent,” the likelihood that the first 
presumption will overcome the second.
230
   
Versions of this formulation appear in the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of 
the Church,
231
 the U.S. Catholic bishops’ statement advocating abolition of the 
death penalty,
232
 and in academic commentary.
233
 
                                                     
230
 See CCC, supra note 85 § 2267.  The Catechism’s complete statement follows:  
Assuming that the guilty party’s identity and responsibility have been 
fully determined, the traditional teaching of the Church does not exclude 
recourse to the death penalty, if this is the only possible way of 
effectively defending human lives against the unjust aggressor.   
If, however, nonlethal means are sufficient to defend and protect 
people’s safety from the aggressor, authority will limit itself to such 
means, as these are more in keeping with the concrete conditions of the 
common good and are more in conformity to the dignity of the human 
person. 
Today, in fact, as a consequence of the possibilities which the state has 
for effectively preventing crime, by rendering one who has committed an 
offense incapable of doing harm - without definitely taking away from 
him the possibility of redeeming himself - the cases in which the 
execution of the offender is an absolute necessity “are very rare, if not 
practically nonexistent.” 
Id. (quoting John Paul II, Encyclical Letter Evangelium Vitae § 56 (1995)). 
231
 The Compendium states that 
[t]he Church sees as a sign of hope a growing public opposition to the 
death penalty, even when such a penalty is seen as a kind of legitimate 
defence on the part of society. . . . The growing aversion of public 
opinion towards the death penalty and the various provisions aimed at 
abolishing it or suspending its application constitute visible 
manifestations of a heightened moral awareness. 
COMPENDIUM, supra note 43 § 405 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  
232
 USCCB, supra note 43, at 12 (“In its traditional teaching as summarized in the 
Catechism of the Catholic Church, the Church affirms the right and duty of legitimate 
public authority to inflict punishment proportionate to the gravity of the offense.  Recourse 
to the death penalty is not absolutely excluded: the death penalty is not intrinsically evil … 
Nevertheless, the Church teaches that in contemporary society where the state has other 
nonlethal means to protect its citizens, the state should not use the death penalty.”) 
(quotations omitted). 
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For purposes of comparing Catholic teaching to U.S. death penalty 
jurisprudence, elements of the preceding definition merit elaboration.  From the 
premise of “safeguarding the common good,” the first presumption asserts that the 
state has a “[l]egitimate” right and “grave duty” to defend life against unjust 
aggression,
234
 and thus is not “exclude[d from] recourse to the death penalty[.]”235  
But this presumption is restrictive, permitting capital punishment only where an 
aggressor’s identity and guilt have been ascertained, and where execution is “the 
only possible” effective means for the state to fulfill its protective duty.236  The 
teaching does not flesh out what these limitations should look like.  But that is 
unsurprising, for the Church’s position is meant to frame the death penalty’s moral 
contours, not provide civil authority with a blueprint for law proper to its sphere.
237
 
In any event, restricting the premise that the state has the right to execute 
people is fleshed out in the teaching’s second presumption, asserting that the state 
should limit itself to nonlethal defensive means sufficiently capable of achieving 
its protective obligation.  This normative prescription includes the important 
substantive assumption that nonlethal protective means “are more in keeping with 
the concrete conditions of the common good and are more in conformity to the 
dignity of the human person.”238  As the preceding discussion made clear, these 
norms are a critical hinge for comparing the Catholic and U.S. approaches. 
The teaching’s third component argues that historical developments have 
made effective, alternative protective means sufficiently available that instances 
today when capital punishment “is an absolute necessity ‘are very rare, if not 
practically nonexistent.’” 239   Notable is this component’s combination of 
                                                                                                                                      
233
 See generally, e.g., BRUGGER, supra note 63; MEGIVERN, supra note 63; Avery 
Cardinal Dulles, Catholic Teaching on the Death Penalty: Has It Changed?, in RELIGION 
AND THE DEATH PENALTY 23, supra note 9; Ghoshray, supra note 17. 
234
 CCC, supra note 85 §§ 2265-66. 
235
 Id. §2267. 
236
 Id.; see also COMPENDIUM, supra note 210 § 405 (same). 
237
 See USCCB, supra note 43.  Moreover, not providing a more specific blueprint is 
consistent with the principle, also central to Catholic social teaching, that civil authority 
occupies its own proper sphere.  See discussion infra, note 254 and accompanying text. 
238
 CCC, supra note 85 § 2267. 
239
 Id. (quoting Evangelium Vitae, supra note 230 § 56). 
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utilitarianism with a normative assertion verging on abolitionism,
240
 as seen in the 
U.S. Catholic bishops’ iteration of the general teaching: 
[1] The sanction of death, when it is not necessary to 
protect society, violates respect for human life and 
dignity. 
[2] State-sanctioned killing in our names diminishes 
all of us.  
[3] Its application is deeply flawed and can be 
irreversibly wrong, is prone to errors, and is biased by 
factors such as race, the quality of legal representation, 
and where the crime was committed.   
[4] We have other ways to punish criminals and 
protect society.
241
 
Worth noting is the assertion that the death penalty “diminishes” society as a 
whole (presumably in a moral sense), echoing the commentary by Andrew Cohen 
and Ty Alper cited earlier, and dicta in Kennedy.
242
  Nor is the resonance 
exclusively contemporary: prominent early American jurist and statesman Edward 
Livingston urged restricting the death penalty in strikingly similar words: 
The right to inflict death exists, but . . . it must be in 
defense, either of the individual or social existence; and 
it is limited to the case where no other alternative 
remains to prevent the threatened destruction.  
Societies have existed without it. … In those societies, 
therefore, it was not necessary.  Is there anything in the 
state of ours that makes it so?
243
 
Interpenetration again looms large.  For further comparative purposes it is 
important to highlight meta-juridical themes informing the positivist elements of 
Catholic teaching, as many echo elements of U.S. death penalty jurisprudence. 
C. Catholic teaching as jurisprudence  
Most relevant to this Article’s comparative approach to capital punishment 
as law and morality jurisprudence are Catholic teaching’s attention to authority and 
moral order, human dignity and the common good, and the purposes of 
                                                     
240
 In “renew[ing] [their] call” to end the death penalty, the U.S. Catholic bishops 
described it as both “unnecessary”—a utilitarian assertion—and “unjustified in our time 
and circumstances,” which is a normative consideration.  USCCB, supra note 43, at 4. 
241
 Id. 
242
 Compare discussion supra, notes 34-38 and accompanying text, with Kennedy, 554 
U.S. at 420. 
243
 MEGIVERN, supra note 63, at 304-05 n.4 (citation omitted). 
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punishment.  Moreover, their conceptual development in Church teaching over 
time suggests how that teaching can engage broader death penalty discourse. 
1. Summary of meta-juridical themes 
The Church’s traditional death penalty teaching intertwined transcendent 
and temporal conceptions of existential order.  Civil authority had a duty, in 
concert with ecclesiastical authority, to ensure that a fallen social order would as 
closely as possible approximate the perfect order ordained by God.
244
  Saint 
Augustine expressed this view in his “Two Cities” metaphor, envisioning order as 
the most important characteristic that temporal and religious authority share.
245
  
Given his generally dim conception of human moral fallibility, authority’s role 
maintaining order was largely coercive.
246
  One can see how permissive 
approaches to capital punishment would accord with such a view. 
In contrast, Saint Thomas Aquinas asserted that authority could positively 
shape order and advance the human condition, conceiving of both civil and 
ecclesiastical authority in terms of parental solicitude.
247
  This metaphor informed 
justice and punishment.
248
  Also crucial was what Aquinas, and the subsequent 
Catholic tradition, understood to be the integrating principle of natural law.
249
  In 
broad strokes, Catholic natural law theory holds that, inasmuch as principles of 
divine law are inscribed in the order of nature and in human conscience, positive 
                                                     
244
 ANDREW SKOTNICKI, CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 39-44 (2008). 
245
 SAINT AUGUSTINE OF HIPPO, CITY OF GOD, in AUGUSTINE: POLITICAL WRITINGS 3 
(Michael W. Tcacz & Douglas Kries trans., Ernest L. Fortin & Douglas Kries eds., 1994). 
246
 SKOTNICKI, supra note 244, at 39-41. 
247
 See generally SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, ON THE GOVERNANCE OF RULERS (Gerald 
B. Phelan ed., 1938), ON LAW, MORALITY, AND POLITICS (Richard J. Regan & William P. 
Baumgarth, trans. & eds., 2nd ed. 2003); I-II  SUMMA THEOLOGICA qq. 87, 94, 96, 105.  
Skotnicki, supra note 244, at 41-44, cogently summarizes Aquinas’s thought here. 
248
 See SKOTNICKI, supra note 244, at 41-44. 
249
 Much of Catholic moral and social teaching stems from the natural law tradition, on 
the basis of which “the Catholic Church has maintained [that] it is possible to formulate 
teaching that really does speak to all people in all settings.”  Himes, supra note 80, at 5.  
This premise is not immune from epistemological and other critiques, akin to those many 
legal scholars pose to natural law theorists.  Here it suffices to assert, simply as a 
descriptive matter, that part of Catholic death penalty teaching’s salience lies in its 
rootedness in the broad Western legal tradition, elements themselves of which are indebted 
to natural law theory.  See, e.g., BERMAN, supra note 59, at 144-47. 
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law can articulate rationally discernible, universalizable norms.
250
  This approach 
permitted Aquinas to assert that civil law should not contradict divine law, while 
affirming that religious and secular spheres possess respective, proper roles.
251
 
Drawing on this tradition, Catholic social teaching today, including on the 
death penalty, endorses an epistemological and juridical distinction between the 
religious and secular spheres as having proper sources of authority, modes of 
reasoning, and responsibilities in social order.
252
  Theoretically, then, Catholic and 
secular perspectives can be “translated.”  The Church’s approach to human dignity, 
human rights, and the common good, as three interrelated principles of moral order 
meant to inform positive law, represent specific terms of substantive translation. 
First, a theological premise—“The Church sees in men and women, in 
every person, the living image of God”253—orients the Church’s conception of 
human dignity.  But it also identifies its secular, social dimensions: 
“the social order and its development must invariably 
work to the benefit of the human person, since the order 
of things is to be subordinate to the order of persons, 
and not the other way around.”[] . . . [Thus i]t is 
necessary to “consider every neighbor without 
                                                     
250
 In its simplest form, Catholic natural law theory rests on the premise that human 
reason bears the capacity to reflect on “nature”—in a sense, the reality of creation, 
understood to be given by God—and from that reflection to abstract transcendent moral 
norms and laws the obedience to which, via codification in human positive law, facilitates 
full human flourishing.  See generally COMPENDIUM, supra note 210 §§ 140-42; Stephen J. 
Pope, Natural Law in Catholic Social Teachings, in MODERN CATHOLIC SOCIAL 
TEACHING, supra note 81, at 41.  Cf. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 59, at 866 
(defining natural law, in part, as “[a] philosophical system of legal and moral principles 
purportedly deriving from a universalized conception of human nature or divine justice”). 
251
 SKOTNICKI, supra note 244, at 42, 42-44. 
252
 The COMPENDIUM provides:  
[T]he distinction between the political and religious spheres … is a value 
that has been attained and recognized by the Catholic Church and 
belongs to the inheritance of contemporary civilization. … The social 
doctrine of the Church is not an intrusion into the government of 
individual countries[,] … [inasmuch as t]he principle of autonomy 
involves respect for every religious confession on the part of the State[.] 
… In a pluralistic society, secularity is a place for communication 
between the different spiritual traditions and the nation.  
COMPENDIUM, supra note 210 §§ 571-72 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  
This view is consistent with Catholic teaching’s affirmation that the state possesses the 
right, in principle, to inflict capital punishment. 
253
  Id. §§ 140-42. 
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exception as another self, taking into account first of all 
his life and the means necessary for living it with 
dignity.”  Every political, economic, social, scientific 
and cultural programme must be inspired by the 
awareness of the primacy of each human being over 
society . . . . 
254
 
That Catholic moral reasoning tenets have explicit social dimensions making them 
“translatable” to the secular sphere should be evident in this normative counsel. 
Church teaching’s situation of human dignity within a broad conception of 
human rights offers further evidence.  Following Pope John XXIII’s endorsement 
of “universal, inviolable, and inalienable” human rights in his 1963 encyclical 
Pacem in Terris, the Second Vatican Council signaled the Church’s engagement of 
modern human rights theory: “the movement towards the identification and 
proclamation of human rights is one of the most significant attempts to respond 
effectively to the inescapable demands of human dignity.”255  Per Catholic social 
theory, however, both human dignity and human rights necessarily have a social 
context, framed in terms of the common good, which the Second Vatican Council 
defined as “the sum total of social conditions which allow people, either as groups 
or as individuals, to reach their fulfillment more fully and more easily.”256  These 
principles—human dignity, human rights, and the common good—inform Catholic 
canon law,
257
 and are evident in its death penalty teaching. 
                                                     
254
 Id. § 132 (quoting Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et Spes § 26, 27 (1965); citing 
CCC, supra note 85 § 2235). 
255
 COMPENDIUM, supra note 210 § 152 (citing Second Vatican Council, Declaration 
on Religious Freedom Dignitatis Humanae § 1 (1965)).  See also David Hollenbach, 
Human Dignity in Catholic Thought 1, 6, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK ON HUMAN DIGNITY 
(forthcoming, 2012; draft on file with author) (describing as “a remarkable development,” 
historically speaking, “the Roman Catholic community’s … emerg[ence] as a vigorous 
global advocate of human rights,” and its status as “a participant in what John Rawls has 
called an ‘overlapping consensus’ on a public philosophy of human dignity and human 
rights … [allowing] people from diverse religions or cultures [to] reach agreement on the 
ethical standards for the institutions that structure their lives together.”). 
256
 Pastoral Constitution Gaudium et Spes § 76 (1965).  See also COMPENDIUM, supra 
note 210 §§ 164-70 (summarizing the concept of the common good in both church tradition 
and contemporary sources). 
257
 John Paul II, Address to the Tribunal of the Roman Rota (Feb. 17, 1979), 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/speeches/1979/february/documents/hf_jp-
ii_spe_19790217_roman-rota_en.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2011) (“Canon law agrees 
with and fosters … the affirmation of the self as an authentically social being through 
acknowledgement of and respect for the other as a person endowed with universal, 
inviolable, and inalienable rights and invested with a transcendent dignity.”). 
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Indeed, affirming human dignity is part and parcel of authority’s protective 
role, which itself is conceived in terms of ensuring the common good within a 
broadly integrated moral and political order: 
Considering the human person as the foundation and 
purpose of the political community means in the first 
place working to recognize and respect human dignity 
through defending and promoting fundamental and 
inalienable human rights: “In our time the common 
good is chiefly guaranteed when personal rights and 
duties are maintained.”[]  The rights and duties of the 
person contain a concise summary of the principal 
moral and juridical requirements that must preside 
over the construction of the political community.  
These requirements constitute an objective norm on 
which positive law is based . . . .
258
   
For these reasons, recourse to capital punishment is permissible if it is the only 
means of securing order, and insofar as it gives way, wherever possible, to 
nonlethal protective means more in conformity with human dignity.  In other 
words, utilitarian ends such as protecting the body politic are never only utilitarian.  
Such protection never can be divorced from a corporate, social moral identity, 
human dignity being its substantive core.  Thus, norms for criminal punishment 
that deeply grapple with human dignity reflect as much on a body politic as on 
those whom it condemns, to employ a rephrasing of secular legal commentators’ 
view of contemporary capital punishment’s socially reflexive moral resonance.259 
What Catholic death penalty teaching does not spell out is how, in a 
pluralistic culture with a separation of church and state, civil authority determines, 
so as to uphold, the substantive content of “human dignity” lest it remain a mere 
shibboleth, to recall Professor Moore’s moral reasoning analysis.260   Here this 
Article’s treatment of death penalty jurisprudence echoes the Catholic tradition, 
and may aid its own development.  That this tradition has developed and yet still 
can, thus serving as a conversation partner to a broader integrative jurisprudence, 
is a premise that the tradition itself supports, as the following subsection argues. 
2. Development of doctrine 
Cardinal John Henry Newman offered the first modern systematic theory 
of the development of doctrine, a theory important to Catholic theology and social 
                                                     
258
 COMPENDIUM, supra note 210 § 388 (citations omitted). 
259
 See notes 34-38, supra, and accompanying text. 
260
 See note 149, supra, and accompanying text. 
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teaching, in 1845 in An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine, though 
its theoretical roots stretch back at least to Aquinas.
261
  Professor Robert Kennedy 
has described how versions of the doctrine turn on two analyses: (1) the degree of 
a teaching’s authoritativeness in the Church; and (2) whether a “developed” 
expression of that teaching represents a basic translation of the tradition into a new 
language or context, a new formulation for a previously-unaddressed situation, or a 
reformulation of what came before, in light of or as applied to new realities.
262
 
Judge John T. Noonan, Jr., a prominent Catholic scholar and judge of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, has significantly contributed 
to this scholarship.
263
  His approach is germane here given his versatility with both 
the Catholic intellectual tradition and American jurisprudence.  As he observes, 
[c]onditions and practices have at times anticipated the 
development of moral doctrine within the Church and 
given rise to the development.  An economy based on 
commercial credit preceded the revision of the rules on 
usury.  The rise of democratic, liberal societies, most 
notably the United States, preceded Vatican II’s 
Declaration of Religious Liberty.  The very general 
practice of civil divorce preceded the current practice 
of divorce by papal rescript.  The abolition of slavery 
almost everywhere was in advance of Vatican II’s 
categorical condemnation of slavery.
264
 
                                                     
261
 See generally, e.g., JOHN T. NOONAN, A CHURCH THAT CAN AND CANNOT 
CHANGE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF CATHOLIC MORAL TEACHING (2005); Christopher Kaczor, 
Thomas Aquinas on the Development of Doctrine, 62 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 283 (2001). 
262
 Robert G. Kennedy, Development of Doctrine in Moral Theology: Can What Was 
Once Wrong Now Be Right?, 1 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 253, 255-57 (2003).  Concerning levels 
of authority accorded to substantive Church teaching, see note 214, supra, and 
accompanying text. 
263
 It should be noted that while Catholic scholars do not universally accept Judge 
Noonan’s approach to doctrinal development, the merits and implications of this intra-
Catholic debate are beyond the scope of this Article.  Compare, e.g., M. Cathleen Kaveny, 
Development of Catholic Moral Doctrine: Probing the Subtext, 1 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 234, 
235 (2003) (describing Judge Noonan’s approach and debates it has triggered) with 
Kennedy, supra note 262, at 255-57, 264-72 (critiquing elements of Judge Noonan’s 
account of evolutionary doctrinal development in the Church’s moral theology). 
For an instructive comparison of change within religious legal systems, see Silvio 
Ferrari, Adapting Divine Law to Change: The Experience of the Roman Catholic Church 
(With Some Reference to Jewish and Islamic Law), 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 53 (2006) 
(distinguishing between particular religions’ notions of immutable divine law, and 
historical and theological forces admitting of change at the level of application).  Professor 
Ferrari also addresses change in death penalty teaching in Jewish law.  Id. at 54-55. 
264
 NOONAN, supra note 261, at 210 
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To summarize: the “development of moral doctrine can and does occur by human 
experience leading to better understanding of human nature.”265   
This perspective evokes the theory of religious-secular interpenetration.  
Moreover, inasmuch as Judge Noonan urges that a kind of “deepening” inherent in 
the development of doctrine, which yields more profound understanding through, 
in relevant part, the “intellectual, moral, emotional, and social[ development] of 
human beings,” 266  his analysis also evokes Professor Berman’s vision of 
integrative jurisprudence.  Both doctrinal development and integrative 
jurisprudence, then, represent a process that engages a community, guided by its 
authoritative sources, as these sources are reflected in new understandings of 
human realities for which those sources have normative value and provide 
normative direction.  As Professor Cathleen Kaveny has argued, 
[i]n both moral theology and law, questions of 
development cannot be addressed in the abstract; they 
must be addressed in the relevant context.  What, 
concretely, does this mean?  In my view, it puts us to 
work.  We cannot hope to address the pressing 
questions of our day in the context of [a given] … 
moral tradition without knowing that tradition.
267
 
The development of doctrine both describes and helps to explain what has 
occurred in Catholic death penalty teaching.
268
  One need only juxtapose the 
Roman Catechism of 1566 and the present Catechism to see the historical shift.
269
  
The former emphasizes the state’s protective function and right to impose 
retributive punishment; the latter includes these assumptions but emphasizes 
human dignity.  This is more than an addition of words.  When Pope John Paul II’s 
encyclical letter Evangelium Vitae was published in 1995, then-Cardinal Joseph 
Ratzinger (now Pope Benedict XVI) characterized the encyclical’s death penalty 
teaching as “important doctrinal progress,” acknowledging that it would require 
revision of the Catechism, which occurred in 1997.
270
  Professor Brugger has 
                                                     
265
 Id. at 213. 
266
 Id. at 216. 
267
 See Kaveny, supra note 263, at 252. 
268
 See BRUGGER, supra note 63, at 141 (applying approaches to doctrinal development 
to Catholic death penalty teaching). 
269
 Compare notes 85 & 226, and accompanying text. 
270
 See MEGIVERN, supra note 63, at 1 (citing NAT’L CATHOLIC REPORTER 3 (Apr. 7, 
1995)). 
 THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT, CATHOLIC TEACHING, AND DEATH PENALTY DISCOURSE 61 
© 2012 Kurt M. Denk 
Draft accepted for publication, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. --- (forthcoming 2012/2013) 
described Evangelium Vitae’s statement of the “extremely rare, if not practically 
nonexistent” principle in its reflection on the death penalty as having “received 
more notice than any other [topic] in the entire [encyclical].”271   
Scholars debate to what extent the Catechism’s revised statement on the 
death penalty technically represents a development of doctrine.
272
  But however it 
is characterized, a shift occurred.
273
  Moreover, it implies that longstanding meta-
juridical norms concerning authority, moral order, justice, and punishment are 
better understood in light of evolving historical context.
274
  Interpenetration looms 
large given that change in the Catholic teaching can, at least in part, be ascribed to 
historical realities in which the Church finds itself, not simply that exist within it 
alone.  Catholic teaching has learned from “the world,” while its teaching’s deep 
roots in Western jurisprudence and its capacity to employ contemporary categories 
of jurisprudence mean that schools of thought operative in today’s world may be 
able to learn from its own evolutive process.  Part IV addresses this possibility. 
  
                                                     
271
 BRUGGER, supra note 63, at 10. 
272
 Compare, e.g., BRUGGER supra note 63, at 163 (concluding that present teaching 
consistently applies Catholic tradition to changed historical contexts, while incorporating 
theoretical premises, such as human rights theory, of more recent vintage), and James J. 
Megivern, Judge Noonan, Church Change, and the Death Penalty, 1 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 
274, 277 (2003) (describing Pope John Paul II’s approach to the death penalty as one of 
“remarkable change”), with Dulles, supra note 233, at 27-28 (critiquing elements of 
Professor Brugger’s analysis, and emphasizing the present doctrine’s “prudential judgment 
that . . . the death penalty is held to be undesirable in a society like our own, because of 
circumstances that would render the application harmful.” (emphasis added)). 
273
 In a 2002 address at Georgetown University, Justice Scalia expressed frustration 
with the Church’s “change” on the death penalty: “No authority that I know of denies the 
2,000-year-old tradition of the church approving capital punishment. . . . I don’t see why 
there’s been a change.”  Professor Megivern has countered Justice Scalia’s view, arguing 
that Church history is hardly univocal in its death penalty teaching or practice.  Megivern, 
supra note 272, at 275, 277-78 (citing Anne Thompson, Scalia: Stuck in the Past, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 26, 2002, at A21). 
274
 Megivern, supra note 272, at 280-83 (arguing that change in the Church’s teaching 
owes to the post-Vatican II embrace of an historical consciousness, the Church’s embrace 
of human rights theory, and personal leadership by Pope John Paul II, a staunch death 
penalty foe).  See also Michael J. Perry, Capital Punishment and the Morality of Human 
Rights, 44 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2-3 (2005) (situating Catholic death penalty teaching 
within a broad “global morality” of human dignity-premised human rights). 
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IV.   ADVANCING DEATH PENALTY DISCOURSE 
“Religious concerns do not exist in a vacuum; they necessarily affect the 
values encompassed by the freedom of expression.”275  Nor does a death penalty 
jurisprudence that necessarily embodies moral judgment exist in a vacuum, this 
Article’s comparison demonstrating that such jurisprudence engages moral 
reasoning values within broad public discourse, with religious perspectives a part.  
Perhaps for this reason Kennedy’s conceptual vagaries can be forgiven.  Though 
even if they are, that is no reason not to improve.  If this jurisprudence necessarily 
embodying moral judgment is to be integrative—i.e., culturally believable or 
resonant, and judicially administrable—then both its language of human dignity-
affirming proportionate punishment and its means of ensuring it must cohere with 
the evolving standards of decency of “the society so characterizing it.”276  This 
requires a broad public discourse attentive to varied sources and voices that are 
both competent and willing to offer moral reasoning perspectives.  Religious 
perspectives that are not sheer fideism, which divorces faith from reason, or 
fundamentalism, which is unwilling to engage diversity, thus have a role to play. 
A. Development of doctrine and evolving standards of decency 
This Article asserts that Catholic death penalty teaching can be one such 
voice.  For it offers considerably more, historically and conceptually, than mere 
moral exhortation unmoored from the categories of reasoning proper to a secular 
legal context.  It qualifies, that is, as jurisprudence.  Moreover, nor is U.S. death 
penalty jurisprudence a matrix of statutory and case law unswayed by dynamic, 
meta-juridical categories of moral reasoning—many of which, the preceding 
analysis shows, resonate not only with the form but, in several instances, with the 
tone if not substance of Catholic death penalty teaching’s own meta-juridical 
categories.  Both, that is, are examples of a jurisprudence that necessarily embodies 
moral judgment.  But if this jurisprudence is to be integrative, intentional discourse 
is required of its socially, morally conscious interlocutors.  Here the Catholic 
tradition’s theory of the development of doctrine can prove helpful. 
As discussed, situating a teaching’s authority is central to the development 
of doctrine as an analytical construct.  Just as the “jurisprudence” of Catholic death 
penalty teaching taps into a larger construct of authoritative Church teaching, post-
Kennedy death penalty jurisprudence could benefit from more clearly demarcating 
                                                     
275
 Marshall, supra note 50, at 546.  
276
 Furman, 408 U.S. at 382 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
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levels of moral authority proper to constructing, describing, and reviewing the 
evolving standards of decency.  Such a project would stress that the relationship 
between the objective indicia and independent judgment analyses concerns more 
than jurisdiction counting, and requires assessing the nature of majoritarian 
judgments.  It could, for example, test for and distinguish between necessarily 
morally reasoned judgments (e.g., a death sentence is proportionate punishment 
for child rape because _____), versus intuitional judgments about moral questions 
(e.g., child rape is among the most depraved of crimes, thus justifying death).   
Such an analysis goes to the core issue of authority dividing the Kennedy 
justices, and arguably has as an analogue in jurisprudence examining whether a 
challenged state action is impermissibly pretextual.  It also may put a greater onus 
on justices’ exercise of independent judgment, forcing them to articulate 
substantive moral precepts—e.g., concerning human dignity—in terms of 
jurisprudence, which could avoid their devolution to mere moral shibbolethism.  
The Catholic theory of the development of doctrine could prove an aid here, as 
well, given its rootedness in careful assessments of what constitutes doctrine per 
se.
277
  This, too, is an authority question, requiring judges “to judge.”278  And this 
we need judges to do, since neither political majorities nor their representatives can 
as efficiently, not to mention as authoritatively, discern and decide how, whether, 
and when the results of political process cohere with the Constitution.  To rely on 
another analogous comparison, Catholic death penalty teaching has—but, only 
relatively recently—come up with a way to relate human dignity both to a criminal 
offender’s rights, and to the common good as a whole.279  There is no reason that 
U.S. death penalty jurisprudence cannot do something similar; indeed, scholars 
argue that it already has, or is moving that way.
280
 
                                                     
277
 See generally NOONAN, supra note 261, chs. 28-33 (prescribing various tests for 
determining a developing teaching’s doctrinal authenticity). 
278
 See Moore, supra note 17, at 65, and discussion at note 150 and accompanying text. 
279
 See discussion supra, notes 253-58 and accompanying text. 
280
 See note 185 supra; see also Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 
160 U. PA. L. REV. 169 (2011) (offering an empirical and typological analysis of Supreme 
Court opinions’ employment of the concept of dignity, and arguing that “[f]ew words play 
a more central role in modern constitutional law without appearing in the Constitution than 
‘dignity.’  The term appears in more than nine hundred … opinions, but … is a concept in 
disarray.”). 
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For example, assuming that U.S. death penalty jurisprudence continues 
“decently to evolve,”281 analyses akin to Catholic doctrinal development may be 
useful given its attention to synthetic, historical reflection on moral order, the 
common good, justice, and equity as fleshing out the meaning of human dignity 
and its impact on the various justifications for punishment.  This may be what we 
see in those whose long immersion in this jurisprudence leads to them concluding 
that the death penalty’s continued practice cannot be squared with the 
Constitution’s norms.  Justice Stevens’s statement in Baze merits closer scrutiny: 
current decisions by state legislatures, by the Congress 
of the United States, and by this Court to retain the 
death penalty as a part of our law are the product of 
habit and inattention rather than an acceptable 
deliberative process that weighs the costs and risks of 
administering that penalty against its identifiable 
benefits, and rest in part on a faulty assumption about 
the retributive force of the death penalty.
282
   
The discursive process that Justice Stevens—then the Court’s most senior 
justice—commends coheres with this Article’s thesis.  For one could interpret his 
critique as a reflection on the fact that, in the decades since Gregg, the moral 
reasoning inherent to wrestling with capital punishment itself became instructive, 
became a tool for working through the Court’s complex Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence.
283
  That Justice Scalia, the Court’s then next most senior member, 
found Justice Stevens’s about-face so disturbing may but reflect the fact that 
doctrinal development, inasmuch as it is engaged in by a diverse community of 
interpreters, is neither a predictable process nor a straightjacket.
284
  Indeed, the 
                                                     
281
 Professor Goodman closes her study of human dignity in constitutional 
jurisprudence by observing that “our standard of decency continues to evolve,” and arguing 
that “[i]f the evolution is slow, but steady, human dignity will routinely weigh into the 
Court’s constitutional analysis as a value having a constant strength (rather than varying in 
strength according to popular opinion) during the next fifty years.”  Goodman, supra note 
185, at 794 (citation omitted).  Writing in 2006, Professor Goodman’s prediction might be 
seen as prescient, given this Article’s reading of Kennedy. 
282
 Baze, 553 U.S. at 78 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
283
 See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker, The Marshall Hypothesis Revisited, 52 HOW. L.J. 525, 
554 (2009) (“To the extent that various Justices’ partial or total rejection of capital 
punishment is grounded in their deeper knowledge about the death penalty developed 
through their long-term exposure to its implementation, then perhaps their ‘own judgment’ 
is a helpful guide for discerning ‘evolving standards of decency’ rather than an evasion of 
that duty.”); see also Lyke, supra note 185, at 649 (characterizing the evolution of Justice 
Kennedy’s Eighth Amendment views). 
284
 Baze, 553 U.S. at 87-89 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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merits and limitations of such a deliberative process as engaged by the Supreme 
Court rather than legislative bodies are alive in the differences between Justices 
Stevens and Scalia in Baze, and in Kennedy’s majority and dissenting opinions.285  
But this, it would seem, is all the more reason for scholars, lawyers, jurists, and 
other parties involved in death penalty discourse to engage in a process of 
clarifying what the evolving standards of decency, and its reference to human 
dignity, mean and require when authority would inflict the ultimate punishment.  
For example, Catholic teaching continues to develop retributive theory counter-
balanced by restorative emphases.
286
  So, too, rehabilitation theory has traction in 
U.S. jurisprudence—some suggesting that Kennedy and another signal Eighth 
Amendment case, Panetti v. Quarterman, augur this development—in which case 
these developments in both traditions could impact death penalty discourse.
287
  As 
Professor Michael Radelet has argued, the retributive “calculation” of just 
punishment for murder—or for any crime, for that matter—is unsusceptible of 
empirical calculation, unlike deterrence and incapacitation arguments.  In this 
respect, capital punishment in particular “becomes more a moral and less a 
criminological issue.”288 
                                                     
285
 Compare the concurring opinions of Justices Stevens and Scalia in Baze, discussed 
supra, with the rejoinder in Section V of Kennedy to what might be termed “judicial fiat” 
criticisms of the majority’s conclusion, Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 446-47, versus the dissent’s 
argument that the majority’s justifications were unsound.  Id. at 447 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
286
 See, e.g., UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, RESPONSIBILITY, 
REHABILITATION, AND RESTORATION: A CATHOLIC PERSPECTIVE ON CRIME AND CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE (2000), available at http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-life-and-
dignity/criminal-justice-restorative-justice/crime-and-criminal-justice.cfm (last accessed 
Jan. 30, 2012). 
287
 See, e.g., Dan Markel, Executing Retributivism: Panetti and the Future of the 
Eighth Amendment, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1163, 1213 n.189 (arguing that a shift in the 
Supreme Court’s thinking on retributivism in Panetti, 551 U.S. at 930, which addressed the 
legitimacy of the death penalty for those defendants who do not rationally understand why 
they are being executed, has implications for undermining the death penalty’s justification, 
and describing Kennedy v. Louisiana’s treatment of retribution and its additional focus on 
rehabilitation theory); Carol S. Steiker, Panetti v. Quarterman: Is There a “Rational 
Understanding” of the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence?, 5 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 285, 290 (2007) (arguing that the Court’s decision in Panetti “leaves us . . . with 
more global questions about the proper scope of Eighth Amendment constraints on 
punishment and the methodology for determining that scope.”). 
288
 Michael L. Radelet, The Role of Organized Religions in Changing Death Penalty 
Debates, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 201, 209 (2000).  As Professor Radelet argues: 
We cannot gather data to prove, one way or another, how much of a 
given punishment (or benefit) any prisoner (or non-prisoner) “deserves.”  
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Having returned to the law and morality question, it is possible now to 
offer some concluding reflections about translating between moral reasoning 
paradigms for the purposes of discourse, of “dialogue on crime and corrections, 
justice and mercy.”289 
B. Translation for discourse 
This Article having argued the necessity of death penalty discourse more 
intentionally attuned to the moral dimensions of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, 
how will such discourse occur, especially where the signal nuances of its various 
interlocutors—e.g., “Catholic” versus “American,” to paint with a broad brush—
differ radically?  Professor Gregory Kalscheur has proposed axioms that can guide 
religious-secular dialogue while upholding the distinctive nature and independence 
of their respective spheres and institutions.
290
  Several of these highlight how 
                                                                                                                                      
How much we all deserve, instead is a cultural determination greatly 
influenced by prevailing standards of morality. . . . And since retribution 
rests on more of a moral base than an empirical one, it is fundamentally a 
question that religious denominations need to address.  The future of the 
death penalty in the United States will be greatly influenced by how 
religious leaders and organizations deal with this issue. 
Id. at 213-14. 
289
 UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, supra note 286, at 1.  
290
 Gregory A. Kalscheur, John Paul II, John Courtney Murray, and the Relationship 
Between Civil Law and Moral Law: A Constructive Proposal for Contemporary American 
Pluralism, Boston College Law School Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper 
Series, Research Paper No. 38 (May 21, 2004), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=550201.  Professor Kalscheur’s proposed six axioms are: 
(1) The distinction between state and society and public and private 
morality must be respected. . . .  
(2) The moral concerns that govern good lawmaking may sometimes 
demand that civil law not be used to restrain every offense against 
public morality. . . 
(3) Any evaluation of the degree to which the civil law conforms to the 
moral law should consider the legal framework in its entirety.  It is 
not sufficient simply to try to enact criminal prohibitions of offenses 
against public morality. . . . 
(4) The church as a mediating institution has a crucial role to play in 
bringing moral and religious critique of law and public policy into 
public conversation.  The primary context for this role is the realm 
of society and culture. . . . 
(5) Moral and religious dialogue is a crucial component of any effort to 
maintain the connection between the moral order and the civil law. . 
. . 
(6) [Religious documents that] call for a necessary conformity of the 
civil law to the moral law can play a constructive role in public 
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discourse concerning the law and the moral intuitions that inform it require a 
process of translation—a process at the heart of comparative law.  In a sense, what 
is required is a “grammar” consisting of intelligible principles that surface and 
bring into conversation the content of one and then another language—e.g., 
“Catholic” and “American” death penalty discourse.291   
But such conversation is only a beginning, for then the hard work of 
immersion occurs.  The traditions must speak with each other, learning their 
respective nuances, benefiting from the self-critical reflective processes that 
immersion stimulates, and articulating new presumptions and applications as a 
result.  Such an iterative process is what the theory of doctrinal development is 
about and, arguably, what evolving standards of decency are about.  Justice 
Stevens’s brief concurring opinion in Simmons sets this out: 
Perhaps even more important than our specific holding 
today is our reaffirmation of the basic principle that 
informs the Court’s interpretation of the Eighth 
Amendment.  If the meaning of that Amendment had 
been frozen when it was originally drafted, it would 
impose no impediment to the execution of 7-year-old 
children today. . . . The evolving standards of decency 
that have driven our construction of this critically 
important part of the Bill of Rights foreclose any such 
reading of the Amendment.  In the best tradition of the 
common law, the pace of that evolution is a matter for 
continuing debate . . . .
292
   
As Justice Stevens seems to recognize, some iterations will fail the test of 
translation across time.  Others will cast fresh light on new and challenging 
questions in the same way that any student of a language often discovers that she 
learns something new, or perceives something deeper, about her own language and 
the culture that it represents precisely in virtue of the fact that she has brought 
them into dialogue with another.  This is the process, not simply of translation, but 
                                                                                                                                      
policy discourse so long as the claims of the moral law are 
presented in a way that is publicly accessible and intelligible. 
Id. at 28-37. 
291
 As Professor M. Cathleen Kaveny has argued, with respect to religious claims in 
public discourse, “careful attention to the actual function and use of argumentation to 
persuade others of a particular viewpoint may yield a more nuanced understanding of how 
religious warrants should be used by believing individuals when arguing in their capacity 
as citizens.”  M. Cathleen Kaveny, Religious Claims and the Dynamics of Argument, 36 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 423, 429 (2001). 
292
 Simmons, 543 U.S. at 587 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citation omitted; emphasis 
added). 
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of interpenetration.
293
  This Article has argued that such a process not only is 
possible, but in fact already has occurred: a putatively absolute incompatibility of 
religious perspectives on the death penalty and U.S. death penalty jurisprudence 
does not bear out.  Three proposals now emerge for furthering constructive death 
penalty discourse. 
First, the legal academy would do well to continue to refine the grammar 
and syntax of death penalty jurisprudence’s necessarily moral judgment.  Such a 
project would do well to proceed in an interdisciplinary manner, just as this Article 
has interwoven historical theology, moral philosophy, and law.  In doing so, legal 
scholars can identify key principles that stem from a variety of traditions of moral 
reasoning, whether of a religious or broadly humanistic bent.  This process can 
serve to analytically disentangle various threads of cultural moral discourse that 
the interpenetration phenomenon has brought together, and identify and articulate 
principles of translation that can assist in clarifying what different contributors to 
broad social mores bring to the table—or, to the bench, as it were. 
Second, it is certainly presumptuous and probably foolhardy to consider 
advising the Supreme Court on this matter.  Nor would this be the first law review 
article to do so.  Thus: the Court would do well to refine what “counts” in Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence.  The sheer variety of opinions in Baze indicates that 
even more limited legal questions, such as execution methods’ legitimacy, 
engender great controversy, including about capital punishment’s justification.  
The five-votes-to-four decision in Kennedy evidences how justices, in the 
aggregate, are far from clear about how the moral reasoning that its precedents 
require is to proceed, how expansive versus limited that reasoning should be, and 
of what its “own judgment” consists.  Bearing disestablishment values in mind, not 
to mention its prescriptions, if legal scholars succeed at drafting comprehensive 
grammars of translation that synthesize the range of religious and non-religious 
moral intuitions that inform the “mores of society” regarding capital punishment, 
the Constitution’s arbiters would have resources to better articulate how such—and 
which—broad moral intuitions appropriately play out in applied jurisprudence.  
                                                     
293
 As Professor Örücü argues: 
When elements from two different interpretive communities combine, 
one drawing its understanding from culture and the other from law for 
instance, they may be able to tap into each other and mesh, bringing the 
cultural conversation into a broader narrative.  This in fact is the fit, and 
transpositions and creative tuning at the time of transplants are vital for 
this fit.  If communication and conversation are kept moving, then cross-
fertilization between the seemingly incompatibles can be facilitated.  
Örücü, supra note 79, at 16 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
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Kennedy’s specifically-marked evolving standards of decency and human dignity 
rules are instructive,
294
 but they remain as yet controverted and convoluted.  This 
Article’s comparative model might offer one example for judicial reflection toward 
clarifying and developing Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. 
Third, this Article has maintained that the death penalty in the United 
States exists against a complex historical, social, cultural, religious, moral, and 
legal backdrop.  The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence repeatedly has emphasized 
that this backdrop, loosely termed “the mores of society,” is an integral component 
of its jurisprudence.  But justices have disagreed over the legitimate range of 
sources that should be counted as evidence of such mores, and over when, and 
according to what criteria, their own judgment should kick in.  The project just 
outlined for the legal academy and the judiciary can only benefit from ongoing, 
robust study, discussion, and advocacy by all those engaged in death penalty 
discourse, particularly policy advocates on all sides.  As a culturally conditioned, 
law and morality question par excellence, death penalty jurisprudence neither does 
nor can exist in a vacuum, separated from the “common” jurisprudence that 
cultural commentators, voters, policy advocates, crime survivors and victims 
representatives, and offenders themselves might contribute to the conversation.  To 
the extent that Professors Robinson and Darley are correct regarding highly 
nuanced yet shared moral intuitions regarding the criminal law, discourse can only 
advance in a fruitful manner to the extent that nuanced intuitions remain in 
dialogue, learning from one another and articulating cultural norms and mores 
useful to judicial analysis and reasoning.  As this Article’s study of capital 
punishment in Catholic teaching and U.S. jurisprudence demonstrates, both 
entities, as living traditions, have much to say to one another.  Others do, as well. 
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 See Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 420 (providing that “[e]volving standards of decency 
must embrace and express respect for the dignity of the person, and the punishment of 
criminals must conform to that rule.”); 446 (describing “[t]he rule of evolving standards of 
decency with specific marks on the way to full progress and mature judgment”). 
